William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 30 (2005-2006)
Issue 2

Article 4

February 2006

Restructuring America's Government to Create Sustainable
Development
Jeffrey Rudd

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Sustainability Commons

Repository Citation
Jeffrey Rudd, Restructuring America's Government to Create Sustainable Development, 30 Wm.
& Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 371 (2006), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol30/iss2/4
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr

RESTRUCTURING AMERICA'S GOVERNMENT TO CREATE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
JEFFREY RUDD*
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* Project Assistant for the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University
ofWisconsin-Madison, currently researching the Environmental Protection Agency's
regulation ofnanotechnology; Land Resources Ph. D. student, UW-Madison; former
Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Montana; prosecuting attorney and
private practitioner in Virginia; J.D., Washington & Lee University School of Law;
B.S., Biology, B.A., Philosophy, Virginia Tech. This Article was written for the
2005 Symposium, "Global Terrorism and its Impact on Sustainable Development:
Exploring Linkages Between Sustainable Development, Security and Terrorism,"
organized by the William and Mary EnvironmentalLaw and Policy Review. I am
grateful to the Editorial Board of the Review for its invitation, generous support,
and outstanding, thought-provoking Symposium. The assistance and gracious
hospitality of Ashley Edwards, Sam Brumberg, Stephen Del Percio, Allison
Hatchett, Jennifer Kane, Erin McCool, Stephen McDonald, and Shannon West
made my experience at the Symposium particularly enjoyable. This Article is the
product of deep reflection sparked by helpful comments from Symposium
participants, Editorial Staff, and professors Ray Cross, Scott Mills and Dan
Pletscher at the University of Montana, and related discussions with Professors
Eric MacGilvray, Art McEvoy, and Clark Miller, at the University of WisconsinMadison. The Editorial Staffs professional and patient editing improved this
Article, but the author is solely responsible for the Article's somewhat polemical
approach and all mistakes. This Article sketches the terrain that deserves
deeper exploration to develop connections among environmental law, liberty,
and America's failing institutions. Surely, that is "sustainable development"
proponents' ultimate aim.
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A.

If this were an ordinary case, I would join the opinion
and the Court's judgment and be quite content.
But this is not ordinary, run-of-the-mill litigation.
The case poses-if only we choose to acknowledge and
reach them-significant aspects of a wide, growing,
and disturbing problem, that is, the Nation's and the
world's deteriorating environment with its resulting
ecological disturbances. Must our law be so rigid and
our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render
ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the
traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove
to be entirely adequate for new issues?1
In the 1960s and '70s, Congress enacted environmental legislation reflecting the public's interest in an improved "quality of
life."2 The legislative changes associated with this environmental
1 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755-56 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2 SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL

POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985, at 5 (1987) ("An interest in the
environmental quality of life is to be understood simply as an integral part of the
drives inherent in persistent human aspiration and achievement.").
The conservation movement was an effort on the part of leaders
in science, technology, and government to bring about more
efficient development of physical resources. The environmental
movement, on the other hand, was far more widespread and
popular, involving public values that stressed the quality of
human experience and hence of the human environment.
Conservation was an aspect of the history of production that
stressed efficiency, whereas environment was a part of the
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movement may be conceived in terms of three overlapping
"phases."3 Lasting roughly from 1957 to 1965, 4 the initial phase
of social and legislative change emphasized Americans' "naturalenvironment values in outdoor recreation, wildlands, and open
space."5 These values continued to influence legislation through
the late-1960s and into the 1970s,' producing numerous statutes
including the Wilderness Act of 1964, 7 National Wildlife Refuge

history of consumption that stressed new aspects of the
American standard of living.
Id. at 13. See generally id. at 13-39 (elaborating on the changes in American
values reflected in the transition from the conservation to the environmental
movement).
3 Id. at 54-57.
4
Id. at 54.
5 HAYS, supra note 2, at 54.
6 Id.
("Such general legislation as the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1974, the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, and the Alaskan [National
Interest] Lands [Conservation] Act of 1980 testified to the strength of the
perennial public concern for natural-environment areas."). The findings and
purposes of the legislation listed by Hays and included infra notes 7-22 and
accompanying text provide a glimpse of the social, political and economic forces
of change materializing in law during the Environmental Era. They also point
to an important theme in this article: Sustainable development at the national
level does not provide a new set of abstract goals. Americans wrestled with the
need to balance economic growth against social and ecological values in the
1960s and '70s; socio-ecological values prevailed to produce a myriad of
legislation advancing collective public values and aspirations emphasizing the
needs of future generations. America's current institutional structure corrupts
the implementation of environmental legislation by allowing administrative
agency decisions to unjustly favor the influence of industries' short-term
economic interests over the public's long-term socio-ecological values. See infra
Parts III and IV.
'See Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (2000).
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied
by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not
occupy and modify all areas within the United States and its
possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and
protection in their natural condition, it is hereby declared to be
the policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of
present and future generations the benefits of an enduring
resource of wilderness.
Id. § 1131(a).
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Administration Act of 1966,8 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of
1968, 9 National Environmental Policy Act of 196910 ("NEPA"),
'See National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-ee (2000).
Section 668dd provides in part:
(2) The mission of the [National Wildlife Refuge] System is to
administer a national network of lands and waters for the
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration
of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats
within the United States for the benefit of present and future
generations of Americans.
Id. § 668dd.
' See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
It is ... the policy of the United States that certain selected
rivers of the Nation which, with their immediate environments,
possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic,
fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall
be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their
immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations.
Id. § 1271.
1
oSee National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2000).
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.
Id. § 4321.
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity
on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences ofpopulation growth,
high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and
recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of
the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and
measures ... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
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Endangered Species Act of 197311 ("ESA"), National Forest
Management Act of 1976 ("NFMA"), 12 and the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980.13
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
Id. § 4331(a).
11 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000). "The purposes of
this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species.. . ." Id. § 1531(b).
12
See National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14(2000). The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held in West Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton
League ofAmerica, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (1975) (the Monongaheladecision),
that the Forest Service had authorized clear-cut sales in violation of the 1897
Forest Service Organic Act's statutory language, 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed 1976).
Butz, 522 F.2d at 947-50. Monongahela virtually halted the agency's logging
operations and forced Congress to heed public outcry directed at the Service's
forest management practices. Congress's decision to enact NFMA reflected the
federal legislature's growing"recognition of the importance ofbiodiversity." Julie
A. Weis, Eliminatingthe National ForestManagementAct's Diversity Requirement as a Substantive Standard, 27 ENVTL. L. 641, 641 (1997) (reviewing the
historical events leading to NFMA's passage and examining the statute's biodiversity requirements); see also Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson,
Land and Resource Planningin the NationalForests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 295-306
(1985). NFMA's legislative findings illustrate Congress's growing awareness in
the 1970s of the importance of ecology and future generations' interests to
natural resource management. "[T he new knowledge derived from coordinated
public and private research programs will promote a sound technical and
ecological base for effective management, use' and protection of the Nation's
renewable resources." 16 U.S.C. § 1600(4) (2000). "[The United States] Forest
Service has both a responsibility and an opportunity to be a leader in assuring
that the Nation maintains a natural resource conservation posture that will
meet the requirements of our people in perpetuity." Id. § 1600(6).
13
See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233
(2000). Its purpose was "to preserve for the benefit, use, education, and
inspiration of present and future generations certain lands and waters in the
State of Alaska that contain nationally significant natural, scenic, historic,
archeological, geological, scientific, wilderness, cultural, recreational, and
wildlife values. . . ." Id. § 310 1(a).
It is the intent of Congress in this Act to preserve unrivaled
scenic and geological values associated with natural landscapes;
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The second phase, which lasted from 1965 to 1972,'4 marked
a rise in Americans' concern "about the adverse impact of industrial development, with a special focus on air and water
pollution." 5 This phase led to the creation of the Clean Air Act of
1970,16 Clean Water Act of 1972,'7 pesticide control legislation, and
to provide for the maintenance of sound populations of, and
habitat for, wildlife species of inestimable value to the citizens
of Alaska and the Nation, including those species dependent on
vast relatively undeveloped areas; to preserve in their natural
state extensive unaltered arctic tundra, boreal forest, and
coastal rainforest ecosystems; to protect the resources related to
subsistence needs; to protect and preserve historic and
archeological sites, rivers, and lands, and to preserve wilderness
resource values and related recreational opportunities including
but not limited to hiking, canoeing, fishing, and sport hunting,
within large arctic and subarctic wildlands and on freeflowing
rivers; and to maintain opportunities for scientific research and
undisturbed ecosystems.
Id. § 3101(b).
[Tihe designation and disposition of the public lands in Alaska
pursuant to this Act are found to represent a proper balance
between the reservation of national conservation system units
and those public lands necessary and appropriate for more
intensive use and disposition, and thus Congress believes that
the need for future legislation designating new conservation
system units, new national conservation areas, or new national
recreation areas, has been obviated thereby.
Id. § 3101(d).
14 HAYS, supra note 2, at 55.
15
Id.at 54.
1 See Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017431 (2000). "The Congress finds.., that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development,
and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to
the public health and welfare." Id. § 7401(a)(2).
The purposes of this subchapter are(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population;
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and
development program to achieve the prevention and control of
air pollution;
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additional laws targeting the ecologically disruptive effects of
industrial activities.'" The third phase, which spanned the 1970s,
was characterized by public reaction to industrial discharge of
toxic chemicals threatening human health. 19
During the third phase, economic and political events
encouraged the re-emergence of industry associations' power over
Congress's lawmaking machinery. 20 The 1973-74 energy crisis
helped to quiet the environmental movement as energy industries
politically touted the need for new energy exploration projects.2 '
"Demands for the development of new energy sources increased
significantly the political influence of the energy industries, which
had long chafed under both natural-environment and pollutioncontrol programs. Now environmental leaders often could scarcely
be heard."22 Amory Lovins' prophetic emphasis on long-term energy
policies fell on political ears deafened by industries' control over
23
public policy.

(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and
local governments in connection with the development and
execution of their air pollution prevention and control programs;
and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of
regional air pollution prevention and control programs.
Id. § 7401(b).
"A primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable
Federal, State, and local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions
of this chapter, for pollution prevention." Id. § 740 1(c).
17 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§
12511387 (2000) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
18 HAYS, supra note 2, at 54. For a comprehensive list of environmental
legislation from the 1960s and 1970s, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 27 (1990) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION].
1
9 HAYS,
20
21

supra note 2, at 55-56.
Id. at 56.

id.

22 Id.

In 1976, Amory Lovins warned that America's energy consumption policies
ignored the long-term consequences of fossil fuel addiction. Amory B. Lovins,
23
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The United States has forgotten the environmental policy
lessons of the 1960s and '70s that suggest a cautious assessment
of the rewards purportedly offered by economic growth. The
temporal and political separation afforded by a generation has
diluted history's lessons and fostered a nation in denial about
short- and long-term socio-ecological harms. The situation is
aggravated by the current socio-economic and political climate,
which marginalizes the ability of environmental advocates to
influence national policies. The war on terror's preeminent policy
status helps shield Congress and the President from accountability
for failing to alleviate socio-ecological risks that threaten the
country's long-term stability.24 Government agencies have relied
on the war on terror to justify restrictions on public access to
information,25 military exceptions to environmental laws and
regulations,26 and "emergency measures" which undermine civil
liberties.

Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FoREIGN AFF. 65, 66 (Oct. 1976).
"Conservation, usually induced by price rather than by policy, is conceded to be
necessary but it is given a priority more rhetorical than real." Id. Lovins argued
that America's energy policies, often characterized "as the bastion of free
enterprise and free markets," should be based on a socio-political strategy that
freed Americans from their addiction and enhanced institutional stability
through government support for conservation and alternative energy
technologies. Id. at 92.
24 Military operations abroad and the socio-political impacts of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 alter relations among the American people and the
government, limit funds available for social, economic and environmental
programs, and tear at the fabric of society through death, injury, and the social
separation caused by military deployments. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
25 See, e.g., Patricia Salkin Address at William & Mary EnvironmentalLaw &
Policy
Review Symposium (Feb. 5, 2005).
26
See, e.g., Stephen Dycus Address at William & Mary Environmental Law &
Policy Review Symposium (Feb. 5, 2005).
" See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1842-67 (2004) (discussing the historical
relationship between "emergency measures" during times of war, including the
"war on terror," and the Constitution).
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Terrorism's information fall-out further complicates efforts
to enhance the public's weak interest in national environmental
policies.28 However, terrorism is not the primary reason America's
socio-ecological conscious has been in a coma during the past
several decades. The prospect of inspiring Americans' appreciation
for socio-ecological issues is imperiled by the continued expansion
of executive authority over environmental regulatory policy and a
tradition ofgovernment emphasis on economic growth sporadically
interrupted by concern for the environment.29 The executive's
expansion has coincided with a dangerous resurgence of administrative agency authority-environmental regulatory agencies now
function as executive legislators susceptible to factional
pressures. 30 Simply put, socially progressive environmental policies
do not stand a chance unless they are supported by the institutional restructuring of American government to combat corruption
in the administration of environmental law and policy.
National sustainable development strategies attempting to
place economic, environmental, social, and national security issues
on one policy platform 31 divert attention from more pressing
28

See Marc A. Levy, Is the Environment a National Security Issue?, 20 INT'L

(1995) (noting that "[p ] ublic opinion is notoriously out of touch
with the relative seriousness of environmental problems.").
SECURITY 35, 45
29

See infra Part III.

See infra Parts III and IV.
See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Toward a NationalSustainableDevelopment Strategy,
10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69 (2002-03) [hereinafter Dernbach, NationalSustainable
Development] (arguing that the United States should adopt a national
sustainable development strategy integrating "social, economic, environmental,
and security goals in ways that are more and more mutually reinforcing.., over
time"). Id. at 72.
Sustainable development would change the purposes of national
governance as they have been understood in the postwar period
to include protection of the environment and natural resources,
and to preserve not only the environment but also existing social
and economic attainments for future generations. In addition,
sustainable development would result in greater equity within
and among nations.
John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1998).
30

31
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institutional problems. Moreover, broad national proposals face
insurmountable conceptual and pragmatic challenges caused by
the amorphous nature of sustainable development. 32 The practical
problems facing national sustainable development proposals are a
function of asking too much of all-encompassing platforms,3 3
32

The Brundtland Commission defined the phrase as "development that meets

the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON
FUTURE]. Essentially, "sustainable development is a process of change in which
the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of
technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and
enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and
aspirations." Id. at 46 (1987); see also John C. Dernbach, Making Sustainable
Development Happen:FromJohannesburgto Albany, 8 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK
J. 173, 174-78 (2004) [hereinafter Dernbach, Making SustainableDevelopment
Happen]. Professor Dernbach traces the history of"sustainable development"
and asserts that "[i]n a sustainable world, progress is defined not just in terms
of economic development, peace and security, human rights, or national
governance; it is also defined by the extent to which we protect and restore the
environment." Id. at 177. "[Sustainable development] does not subordinate the
environment to development, nor development to the environment. It is about
achieving both, while giving each equal significance. Sustainable development
is not about economic growth now and environmental protection later; it is about
achieving both simultaneously." Id. at 177-78; see also John C. Dernbach,
Targets, Timetables and Effective Implementing Mechanisms: Necessary
BuildingBlocks for SustainableDevelopment, 27 WM. & MARYENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 79, 86 (2002) ("Sustainable development is premised on the interdependence and essential equality of economic development, social well-being,
peace and security, and environmental protection."); J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable
Development: A Five-DimensionalAlgorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 31, 39 (1999) ("The objective of sustainable development, in other
words, is to achieve a social framework in which economy, environment, and
equity all are sustainable in perpetuity over all geographic scales."). But see,
Sabine U. O'Hara, InternalizingEconomics: Sustainabilitybetween Matterand
Meaning, 25 INT'L J. OF Soc. ECON. 175, 175 (1998) (arguing that the "term
sustainability has, in fact, taken on such vague denotations that it has
become meaningless; so much so that ... a new word is needed to express the
challenging relationship between economic and environmental sustainability").
33 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 32, at 38-39 (noting that "[alt the core of this
[sustainable development] concept is 'a process of change in which the
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of
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especially when the platforms' legislative progenitors already
express sufficient environmental aspirations.34 In an important
pragmatic sense, sustainable development policies cannot "cut[]
across artificial boundaries between economic, environmental,
social, and national security issues;"35 the epistemological and
technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and
enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and
aspirations"' (quoting OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 32, at 46)).
34 See, e.g., supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text. Mark Dernbach's discussion of the relationship between sustainable development and NEPA signals
his agreement.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
(footnote omitted) could provide a mechanism for further
integration, but its implementation has not changed
significantly since 1992. Under NEPA, Congress declared the
"continuing policy of the Federal Government" to "create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and to fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)). This and other language
in the statute endorse what is now called sustainable
development.
Dernbach, National Sustainable Development, supra note 31, at 115; see also
Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 678
(2003).
[E]nvironmental law does not suffer from a lack of welldesigned, well-studied policy tools to achieve its goals, but
rather from a lack of urgency among policymakers and the
public concerning the necessity to achieve those goals. Such
urgency simply does not follow from a preanalytic [economic]
worldview in which nature is assumed to be boundless.
Id.
3' Dernbach, National SustainableDevelopment, supra note 31, at 87.
Sustainable development cuts across artificial boundaries
between economic, environmental, social, and national security
issues. As a result, it involves several goals that need to be
accomplished simultaneously, and it is important to find ways
of furthering each goal that do not impede or interfere with the
accomplishment of other goals. Without some strategic sense of
how the nation's security, economic, environmental, and social
objectives are related, and should be realized together, the
country will be less able to effectively realize those objectives.
Efforts by federal agencies that further social, economic, and
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institutional boundaries separating those issues are real at a
fundamental level that precludes dissolution into an overarching
conceptual framework.36
Sustainable development umbrellas targeting antiterrorism
and national security issues37 risk further empowering an Executive
environmental goals at the same time are likely to be more
efficient than efforts directed at only one goal. An integrated
approach is also likely to prevent problems that would cost
much more to alleviate later. Most importantly, perhaps, the
daunting scope of many of these problems means that they can
be resolved only if the government and others act efficiently.
Id.; see also Dernbach, Making SustainableDevelopment Happen,supranote 32,
at 182 (citing STUMBLINGTOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 728-30 (John C. Dernbach ed.,
2002) (arguing that a national sustainable development strategy should
"integrate social, economic, environmental, and security goals, in a coherent and
cost-effective manner")). Substantive policy connections between sustainable
development, national security, and terrorism are generally limited to contextspecific examples. One such example is the need to protect certain
infrastructures (e.g., power grids) essential for America's national security. See
generallyThomas Homer-Dixon, The Rise of Complex Terrorism,FOREIGN POL'Y
52-62 (Jan./Feb. 2002).
36 National policies should not be based on a sustainable development model
aiming to achieve an equally apportioned mix of economic, security,
environmental and social goals-a hypothetical and ultimately unattainable
conceptual framework. The practical aspects of sustainable development require
consideration of knowledge produced by the same disciplines guiding
"development" over the course of the last fifty years, such as: ecology, biology,
physics, chemistry, economics, sociology, political science and law. The
knowledge bearing on development decisions has changed, but the method for
balancing the claims produced continues to hinge on value judgments. Allencompassing sustainable development proposals suffer the illusions of
theoretical cohesion and practical utility. See Jeffrey Rudd, J.B. Ruhl's "Law
and Society System:"Burying Norms and Democracy Under Complexity Theory's
Foundation, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 551 (2005) [hereinafter
Rudd, Burying Norms and Democracy]. The further removed sustainable
development is from a specific problem requiring the balancing of economic,
social, and ecological values, the easier it should be to understand that at the
national level, sustainable development is an integrated, interdisciplinary ideal
piled on top of disciplinary ideals.
" See, e.g., Dernbach, National Sustainable Development, supra 31, at 72
("[S]ustainable development is premised on the interconnected nature of
security, economic, social, and environmental issues. The sustainable development framework would suggest that a full and effective response to terrorism
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already insufficiently accountable for national security and
environmental regulatory decisions.3" Proposals that increase
executive control over environmental issues will raise the bar on39
public access to information relevant to environmental policy,
curtail deliberative decision-making, and further reduce government accountability.4 ° The essential institutional problem plaguing
fair consideration of socio-ecological issues will remain: agency
administrators are unwilling to take regulatory action reflecting
a legitimate level of concern for ecological and social values relative
to economic interests. Sustainable development advocates should
narrow their focus and call for the rejuvenation of deliberative
democracy in the design and implementation of government's
environmental legislation.41
must address the role that economic, social, and environmental conditions may
play in contributing to terrorism."). "When we also realize that sustainable
development requires an antiterrorism effort to achieve peace and security, and
that the world's social, economic, security, and environmental problems are
related, it makes sense to see that the antiterrorism campaign should be part of
a broader sustainable development effort." Id. at 88.
38 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 5 (1990) (arguing that since the IranContra Affair, the "three-part combination of executive initiative, congressional
acquiescence, and judicial tolerance has broadly insulated the president from
foreign affairs accountability"). See generallyid. at 117-49; see also infra Part II.A.
Professor Farina notes a similar trend in the relations between the
Executive and administrative government. "[A] potent combination of constitutionally granted powers, congressional acquiescence (taking the form of
both custom and statute) and institutional and organizational factors have
contributed to the emergence of the President as the dominant force in
regulatory policy making (footnote omitted)." Cynthia Farina, Statutory
Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 452, 503 (1989).
31 See, e.g., Salkin, supra note 25.
40
See infra Parts III and IV.
41 For a discussion of the principles of deliberative democracy, see Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1530, (1992) and Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
Under republican approaches to politics, laws must be supported
by argument and reasons; they cannot simply be fought for or be
the product of self-interested "deals." Private-regarding reasons
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Environmental advocates should marshal their resources to
support the restructuring of institutions 42 that govern the implementation of environmental legislation.' Currently, administrative

are an insufficient basis for legislation. Political actors must
justify their choices by appealing to a broader public good. This
requirement has a disciplining effect on the sorts of measures
that can be proposed and enacted. The requirement of appeal to
public-regarding reasons may make it more likely that publicregarding legislation will actually be enacted. (footnote omitted)
The central idea here is that politics has a deliberative or
transformative dimension. Its function is to select values, to
implement "preferences about preferences," or to provide
opportunities for preference formation rather than simply to
implement existing desires.
Id. at 1544-45.
42 "Institutions" refer to the formal and informal rules constituting the "underlying rules of the game." DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 5 (1990). "The purpose of the rules is to
define the way the game is played." Id. at 4.
Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings
devise to shape human interaction. Are institutions formal or
informal? They can be either ... formal constraints-such as
rules that human beings devise-and in informal
constraints-such as conventions and codes of behavior.
Institutions may be created, as was the United States
Constitution; or they may simply evolve over time, as does the
common law....
Institutional constraints include both what individuals are
prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions
some individuals are permitted to undertake certain
activities.... [T]hey therefore are the framework within which
human interaction takes place. They are perfectly analogous to
the rules of the game in a competitive team sport.
Id. at 5.
" The restructuring is necessary to ensure that principles of deliberative democracy govern agency decisions in implementing statutes. See Mark Seidenfeld,
A Syncopated Chevron: Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 126-27 (1994) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron].
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agencies exercise too much discretion over environmental law and
policy to be fairly considered part of a deliberative democratic
process." Administrators function as legislators largely unaccountable for advancing the public good, with virtually unfettered discretion to maximize the Executive's legislative authority and dilute
the Constitution's framework for deliberative democracy.4 5 "There
is no question but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any
functional or realistic sense of the term." 6
This Article argues the New Deal produced an institutional
framework that encouraged Executive expansion over national
security, fostered the growth of Executive authority over environmental law, and inadvertently contributed to administrative
agencies' corrupt implementation of environmental legislation.
Part II examines the institutions in American government that
organize power over national security and argues that broad
sustainable development platforms risk increasing Executive
control over environmental issues under the guise of national

The administrative bureaucracy plays an essential role in at
least some versions of deliberative democratic theory. The
structure of agencies allows for public participation, political
influence, and reasoned decision-making as part of the
regulatory discourse. In fact, the administrative "branch" of
government may hold the greatest promise for implementing the
deliberative democratic ideal. Deliberative democratic theory,
however, also suggests the need for certain changes in the
manner in which the federal government makes and enforces
law, and achievement of that ideal still requires some
restructuring of the administrative state. The three
constitutionally specified branches of government must
reconceptualize their relationships to administrative agencies to
ensure the proper balance between political responsiveness and
reasoned decisionmaking.

Id.
"The American people pay an unacceptable price for administrators' failure to
advance the goals of existing legislation, as do government agencies' employees
who believe in and strive to implement the legislative principles. See infra Parts
III.C. and IV.
45
See infra Parts III and IV.
46 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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security. The institutional goal should be to reduce, not enhance,
the Executive's power over environmental law and regulation. The
history of constitutional conflicts over national security issues
points to the institutional problems that confront overly-broad
proposals integrating national security and environmental
policies.47 National sustainable development proposals aim too
high, losing touch with the fundamental purpose of environmental
legislation: the restraint of economic development to protect and
advance collective socio-ecological values.
Sustainable development advocates should move away from
overreaching proposals and direct their attention to the insidious
malady threatening the socio-ecological values expressed through
environmental legislation. Part III argues that New Deal justifications for administrative discretion challenged certain principles of
Madisonian republicanism,48 creating a political atmosphere ripe
for exploitation by 21st century Executives. The Executive has
filled the Constitution's "zone of twilight"49 with environmental
agency administrators functioning as an unchecked, legislative
arm of the Executive branch. Environmental agencies' authority
over critical issues is exercised without sufficient constitutional
accountability or deliberation.5" Revisiting James Madison's

" See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
48 SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 16.
[Tihe distribution of national powers served as a major
guarantor of private ordering and also as a check against the
twin dangers to a republic that Madison himself feared most.
The first was factionalism: the usurpation of government by
powerful and self-interested groups. The second was selfinterested representation: the distortion of governance by the
selfish motivations of public officials.
Id.
49 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also infra
notes 106-41 and accompanying text.
50 Cass Sunstein's work from the late 1980s on the relationship between the
administrative state and deliberative democracy provides important (albeit
indirect) support for one of this Article's central themes: environmental agencies
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account of States' legislative corruption under the Articles of
Confederation illuminates the fundamental constitutional
principles that should reinvigorate government's institutions.5 '
Part IV examines corruption in environmental law and
regulation, understood as the evisceration of American constitutional and environmental legislative values through agencies
functioning as a legislative conduit for Executive power. It
contextualizes the corruption issue through a discussion of two
agency rulemaking examples that demonstrate the need for
comprehensive institutional change. The discussion begins with an
inside look, courtesy of the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") Office of Inspector the General ("OIG") and the General
Accounting Office ("GAO"), at the EPA's rulemaking process for the
mercury emissions rule.52 The corruption evident in EPA's
rulemaking process is consistent with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service's ("FWS") rulemaking process a decade earlier,
which forestalled the listing of the Canada Lynx as a "threatened"
species under the ESA.53
Part V concludes with suggestions for structural change in
government that are necessary to curtail corruption in environmental regulation and restore the just implementation of environmental law through agency decisions. Congress and the judiciary
are responsible for restoring a sense of constitutional order to
administrative agency decision-making processes.54 Congressional
function without sufficient accountability to the American people due to the
corrupt influence of industry factions. See infra Part III. See generally
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18; Cass R. Sunstein,
ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421 (1987) [hereinafter
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal]; Cass R. Sunstein, Factions,
Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw]; CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 145-65 (2003).
51 See infra Part III.A.
52
National Emission Standard for Mercury, 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.50-61.56 (2005). See
infra Part IV.A.
53 See infra Part IV.B.
54 See infra Part IV.C.
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investigations should guide institutional modifications necessary
to curtail the Executive's "backdoor" legislation and increase
administrators' constitutional and professional accountability.
Judicial review of environmental agency decisions should rely upon
constitutional principles of accountability and deliberation to
invigorate the "hard look" doctrine.5"
National sustainable development proposals aim for lasting
synergy between the United States' and other nation-states'
environmental, economic, social, and security policies. Although
global issues merit attention, America's natural resources are
threatened by Executive lawmaking accomplished through
administrative rulemaking. The United States' current institutional structure compromises deliberation about environmental
law and policy. National sustainable development platforms send
the wrong political, social, and scientific message, and undermine
the effectiveness of current environmental statutes. Long-term
environmental values hinge upon fundamental institutional
changes that constrain administrators' authority and restore
deliberation and accountability to the political process.
II.

56
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE "ZONE OF TWILIGHT"

The Founders of this Nation were not imbued with
the modern cynicism that the only thing that history
teaches is that it teaches nothing. They acted on the
conviction that the experience of man sheds a good
deal of light on his nature. It sheds a good deal of
light not merely on the need for effective power, if a
society is to be at once cohesive and civilized, but also
on the need for limitations on the power of governors
over the governed.5 7

" See infra notes 196-243 and accompanying text; see also infra Part TV.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
57
Id., 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
56
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The Executive's power over national security 58 is rooted in
traditional notions of sovereignty, secrecy, and unilateral action
not always well contained by constitutional principles of deliberation and accountability. 59 The deterioration of the Nation's socially
progressive, ecologically responsible legislation is largely attributable to the erosion of institutions meant to ensure that the
Executive and its administrative agencies function according to
those same constitutional principles. Over the past several
decades, the President's authority over national security and
environmental policies has expanded significantly relative to that
of Congress.6 ° Proposals that seek to integrate sustainable
development and national security6 ' risk further strengthening

58

See LOUIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 53 (2d ed.

1996) ("'National security' is not a constitutional term and it is a concept too
uncertain to support authority beyond what can be distilled from the
responsibilities and powers bestowed on the President by the Constitution.");
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936); KOH, supra note 38, at 74 ("The term
'national security' was not officially coined until the cold war. Nevertheless, no
fewer than twenty-five of the first thirty-six Federalist Papers concerned
national insecurity, with most linking the young republic's international
weakness to the incapacity of the national government." (citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1937) (footnote omitted)).
"Nos. 3, 4, 14, 23-32, 34, 36 (military and other external weakness); 5-8, 18-20
(fear of foreign intervention and dissolution of the union); 11-12, 22-23 (need to
retaliate against foreign restrictions on trade); 22 (treaty enforcement))."Id.; see
also id. at 74 n.23
(Although the phrase was first used in the National Security Act
of 1947, there is no official definition of the term. The only
quasi-official definition, prepared for a dictionary used by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is: "a military or defense advantage over
any foreign nation or group of nations, or ... a favorable foreign
relations position, or . . . a defense posture capable of
successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within
or without, overt or covert.").
5
9 See infra Part II.B.
60 See KOH, supra note 38, at 5; see also infra Part II. A parallel
expansion has
occurred in Executive authority over United States regulatory policy. See
Farina, supra note 38, at 503.
61 See, e.g., Dernbach, supra notes 31-32, see infra notes 117-49
and
accompanying text.
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Executive control of environmental policy through its national
security authority.
Sustainable development advocates unwittingly aggravate
a tenuous situation for environmental legislation by insisting that
"antiterrorism" strategies lie within the ambits of national
sustainable development policies.62 They have been led astray by
the World Commission's discussion of "peace and security" in
1987.3 The Commission suggested that new conceptions of
national security and sovereignty were necessary to achieve
sustainable development goals.' The Commission's work and
62

See, e.g., Dernbach, National SustainableDevelopment, supra note 31, at 88.

Professor Dernbach argues that a national sustainable development policy's
success depends on "peace and security" and is therefore closely linked to
America's antiterrorism operations.
When we also realize that sustainable development requires an
antiterrorism effort to achieve peace and security, and that the
world's social, economic, security, and environmental problems
are related, it makes sense to see that the antiterrorism
campaign should be part of a broader sustainable development
effort. The purposes of sustainable development, after all, are
human quality of life, opportunity, and freedom. Our nation has
long stood behind these purposes.
Id.
63 See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 32, at 290-307; id. at 19 ("Certain
aspects of the issues of peace and security bear directly upon the concept of
sustainable development."); see also Tim O'Riordan, Environmental Science,
Sustainabilityand Politics,29 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 234,
239 (2004).
Maybe the best bet for environmental science projections of
planetary well-being is to lock the diagnosis into the wider
political theatres of military security, conventional economic
investment, poverty alleviation, hunger removal and the
eradication of public health dangers, notably HIV/AIDS, malaria
and dysentery and the steady onslaught of chronic enslavement
of many cumulative deceases. Revealing the common agendas of
the environmental policy think tanks with the security pundits,
the economic lobbies and the global strategic analysts is a
possible way forward.
Id.
r4 OUR COMMON FUTURE supra note 32, at 290 ("[A] comprehensive approach to
international and national security must transcend the traditional emphasis on
military power and armed competition....").
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government reports may be interpreted to support the inclusion of
antiterrorism strategies in national sustainable development
proposals, and the reshaping of environmental security as a
national security issue.65 "The whole notion of security as traditionally understood-in terms of political and military threats to
national sovereignty-must be expanded to include the growing
impacts of environmental stress-locally, nationally, regionally,
and globally.6 There are no military solutions to 'environmental
insecurity." 1
The Commission's presumptions favoring "sustainable
development goals," however, avoid critical institutional issues.
Conceptions of nation-states' sovereignty are intricately related to
principles of nationalism and national security policies that
emerge through actions guided by formal and informal rules.67 The

6

Id. at 19; see also Robert F. Durant, Whither Environment Security in the PostSeptember 11 Era?Assessing the Legal, Organizationaland Policy Challenges
for the National Security State, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV., 115, 116 (2002) (arguing

that during the Clinton Administration, national security was redefined to
include "'environmental security:' the recognition that global, regional, or
subnational environmental degradation and scarcities abroad and at home" can
threaten the interests of the United States); O'Riordan, supra note 64, at 236
(reporting that "[a] leaked Pentagon report, obtained by The Observer ...
concluded that 'climate change should be elevated beyond a scientific debate to
a US [sic] National Security concern'"). "Environmental degradation and human
misery do go hand in hand, and are now of such significance for economic and
military security that they are on the agendas of the highest politics." Id.
66
OUR COMMON FUTURE supranote 32, at 19. But see Levy, supra note 28, at 53.
Reflecting on his analyses of ozone depletion and global climate change as
"direct environmental threats to U.S. security," Marc Levy concluded that in
each case the analysis "moved away from the literature that explicitly attempts
to link environment and security, and toward a more self-contained
environmental literature." Id.
What would we have gained by considering the ozone depletion
problem [identified in the 1970s] as a security problem?
Contrary to a key assumption underlying the environment and
security literature, the ozone case suggests that as a society we
managed to cope with a serious environmental problem fairly
well without labeling it a "security problem."
Id. at 50.
67 See NORTH, supra note 42.
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resolution of particular historical conflicts among economic, social,
political, and national security actors illuminates the role of
institutions in determining the balance of power in United States
government.6" Revisiting several of the Supreme Court's landmark
national security decisions demonstrates the importance of history
and institutions to substantive political change and highlights the
risks of enhancing Executive power to achieve environmental
objectives.69 The Court's relatively recent redistribution of
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through
time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.
Id. at 3; see also id. at 47 ("Formal rules include political (and judicial) rules,
economic rules, and contracts. The hierarchy of such rules, from constitutions,
to statute and common laws, to specific bylaws, and finally to individual
contracts defines constraints, from general rules to particular specifications.").
[F] ormal rules. . . make up a small (although very important)
part of the sum of constraints that shape choices; a moment's
reflection should suggest to us the pervasiveness of informal
constraints. In our daily interaction with others, whether within
the family, in external social relations, or in business activities,
the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of
conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions.
Id. at 36.
68 See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY
TO
POLITICS

26 (1996).

Political authority in the United States is diffused and the
doctrine of popular sovereignty does not help us understand the
constitutional system that ensures this diffusion. The doctrine
should be abandoned in favor of the concept of political
authority. When we seek the location of political authority in
America in a practical sense, a plausible answer is that
authority lies in a complex governmental system in which the
people participate .... Saying that all political authority lies in
the people, however, is clearly inaccurate. Popular sovereignty
points toward an ideal of direct democracy that has never
existed in the United States and avoids crucial issues of state
authority.
Id.
9
Institutions governing the implementation of environmental legislation are illsuited to conduct national security analysis or accommodate sustainable
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legislative authority to the Executive should raise red flags for
sustainable advocates prone to overlook the institutional framework governing environmental law's implementation. °
Political developments occurring in the 1930s marked the
modern expansion of American presidential power."' Following
the Depression, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ("FDR")
transformed the United States into a world leader in military,
economic, and diplomatic affairs, 72 while creating a new bureau73
cracy capable of managing and dispersing Executive authority.

development policies encompassing national security issues. See Levy, supra
note 28, at 54.
U.S. environmental policy-making has historically been characterized by high reliance on legislative instruments and judicial
review sparked by litigation. This has resulted in an environmental policy style characterized by high reliance on scientific
judgments and, where these are absent, on rigid legislative
criteria capable of strict interpretation by the courts. This policy
style would be singularly unsuited to coping effectively with big
security risks, which require complex judgments concerning
highly uncertain phenomena. They require long-term strategies
that may not be justifiable with reference to science, and
flexibility that may be incompatible with rigid legislation.
Id.
70
See NORTH, supra note 42, at 5.
71 HENKIN, supra note 58, at 85 (noting that "[tihe Executive is sometimes
carried away by ready opportunity and initiative, by expertise, by responsibility,
and by the security of secrecy, to invade where Congress has its claims"); NORTH,
supra note 42, at 93 (arguing that the New Deal era "redefined the
constitutional politics of American foreign affairs").
712See Richard A. Falk, The Extension of Law to Foreign Policy: The Next
Constitutional Challenge, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS 209-10 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988).
73 See KOH, supra note 38, at 97.
[Flollowing the recommendations of the President's Committee
on Administrative Management, Roosevelt created an Executive
Office of the President that would eventually embrace the
Council of Economic Advisers in 1946; the National Security
Council in 1947; the Special Trade Representative in 1963 (now
the U.S. Trade Representative); the Council of Environmental
Quality in 1970... and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy in 1976.

394

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.

[Vol. 30:371

FDR demonstrated the Executive's "functional superiority in responding to external events,"74 which helped future presidents gain
control over the policymaking process "while Congress accepted a
reactive, consultative role."75
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,76 the
Supreme Court reinforced FDR's expansion of executive authority
over national security. In 1936, Congress issued a Joint Resolution
authorizing the President to investigate and determine whether to
issue a proclamation making it "unlawful to sell.., any arms or
munitions of war in any place in the United States to the countries
now engaged in [the Chaco] armed conflict."77 Justice Sutherland's
majority opinion upheld FDR's proclamation 8 against the challenge that the Joint Resolution was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to the President;7 9 the opinion formally
recognized extensive, highly discretionary Executive power over
national security. 0 Sutherland's argument was based on the
President's constitutional responsibility to defend American
74

Id.at 79.

75 id.

299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Violations of such a proclamation would be punishable as a criminal
offense
carrying the potential for fine and imprisonment. Id.
78
Id.at 312-13.
79
Id.at 314-15, 329.
"o299 U.S. at 329.
We deem it unnecessary to consider, seriatim, the several
clauses which are said to evidence the unconstitutionality of the
Joint Resolution as involving an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. It is enough to summarize by saying that, both
upon principle and in accordance with precedent, we conclude
there is sufficient warrant for the broad discretion vested in the
President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute
will have a beneficial effect upon the reestablishment of peace
in the affected countries; whether he shall make proclamation
to bring the resolution into operation; whether and when the
resolution shall cease to operate and to make proclamation
accordingly; and to prescribe limitations and exceptions to which
the enforcement of the resolution shall be subject.
76

71 Id. at 312.
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interests and the critical role of confidential information to
national security decisions."'
Justice Sutherland's opinion opened the door for presidents
to test the limits of their constitutional authority over national
security. President Truman was the first to push this envelope.82
81

"Secrecy in respect of information gathered by [confidential sources] may be

highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful
results." Id. at 320-21.
[The President's action] may well depend, among other things,
upon the nature of the confidential information which he has or
may thereafter receive, or upon the effect which his action may
have upon our foreign relations. This consideration, in
connection with what we have already said on the subject,
discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of
governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by
which the President is to be governed. As this court said in
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311, "As a government, the
United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty.
As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of
nationality, especially those which concern its relations and
intercourse with other countries. We should hesitatelong before
limiting or embarrassingsuch powers."
Id. at 321-22. Curtiss-Wright has been criticized on a number of grounds,
including (1) Justice Sutherland's "key language was dicta," (2) the historical
inaccuracies in Sutherland's "extra-constitutional theory of paramount
unenumerated presidential power in foreign affairs," and (3) the decision's
ambiguous language leads to conclusions inconsistent with Sutherland's claims
concerning the extent of presidential authority in foreign affairs. KOH, supra
note 38, at 94 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2). Commentators' extensive criticism of Justice Sutherland's opinion has not, however, dissuaded FDR's
successors from arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Curtiss-Wright
was "an effective judicial amendment of Article II of the Constitution," that
significantly enhanced the President's enumerated powers in foreign affairs. Id.
at 94. Professor Harold Hongju Koh, a former attorney-advisor in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel, notes that "[almong government
attorneys, Justice Sutherland's lavish description of the president's powers is so
often quoted that it has come to be known as the 'Curtiss-Wright,so I'm right'
cite... ." Id.
2
After World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States began positioning
themselves to influence world events politically and militarily. "In the
unsettlement of two World Wars and the rise of the Russian challenge, we put
a higher premium on community security than we had since our colonial years."
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The power of both the Constitution and the Supreme Court to
vitalize institutional change in government was never more
apparent than after President Truman issued an Executive Order
directing "the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of
the steel mills and keep them running."13 Truman intervened in an
ongoing conflict between steel mill corporations and unionized labor
to resolve a dispute over the terms of collective bargaining agreements.84 When the 650,000 steelworkers went on strike, 5 President
Truman ignored the Taft-Hartley Act and seized the mills. 6
At some eighty-eight steel mills across the country,
the morning of April 9, 1952, things appeared the
same as usual. The morning shifts arrived, production continued, the mills worked by the same men
and managed by the same officials. The one clearly
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 107

(1956). The United States retained

a strong military presence in Europe and generally viewed social and political
unrest in the Third World as a national security threat caused by the Soviet
Union and the spread of Communism. KOH, supra note 38, at 99-100, 105-06.
' Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. President Truman's decision to seize the mills
was preceded by his declaration of a national emergency pursuant to the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 ("TWEA").
The national emergency most often invoked in connection with
exercises of TWEA powers was the emergency that had been
declared on December 16, 1950, by President Truman in response
to the developing Korean conflict.... That Proclamation warned
of the threat of Communist aggression. Because ofthis declaration
of emergency, the President retained broad authority of indefinite
duration to respond to anything that logically could be related to
the general threat of the spread of Communism.
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 245-46 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. Truman considered the position adopted by the
Wage Stabilization Board which recommended a 26c/hour increase in employees'
wages to be a reasonable one. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN, 897-98 (1992).
The steelworkers had not received a pay raise since 1950, in spite of the mills'
production of "record tonnage" and rising profits. Id. The United Steelworkers of
America
union agreed, but the industry demanded an increase in steel prices. Id.
8
5 Id. at 897.
86 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 656-58 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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visible sign of change were the American flags that
flew over the mills. In Washington, the Secretary of
Commerce, Charles Sawyer, had assumed legal
command of the industry. 7
The seizure of the steel mills threw constitutional principles into
a temporary state of disarray, reconfiguring the institutions relied
upon by millions of Americans, and uprooting political, economic,
and social relationships.8 "
Truman's decision to seize the mills was challenged as an
unconstitutional exercise of executive power. 9 Justice Black's
majority opinion noted that President Truman perceived the steel
mill strike as an immediate threat to national security, 90 but
87
88

MCCULLOUGH, supra note 84, at 899.
See NORTH, supranote 42, at 25 ("Institutions exist to reduce the uncertainties

involved in human interaction.").
Stability is accomplished by a complex set of constraints that
include formal rules nested in a hierarchy, where each level is
more costly to change than the previous one. They also include
informal constraints, which are extensions, elaborations, and
qualifications of rules and have tenacious survival ability
because they have become part of habitual behavior. They allow
people to go about the everyday process of making exchanges
without having to think out exactly the terms of an exchange at
each point and in each instance. Routines, customs, traditions,
and conventions are words we use to note the persistence of
informal constraints, and it is the complex interaction of formal
rules and informal constraints, together with the way they are
enforced, that shapes our daily living and directs us in the
mundane (the very word conjures up images of institutional
stability) activities that dominate our lives. Although the mix of
rules and norms varies... the combination nevertheless provides
us with the comfortable feeling of knowing what we are doing and
where we are going.
Id. at 83.
89 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584-87.
90
"The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and
other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work stoppage
would immediately jeopardize our national defense and that governmental
seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel." Id. at 583; see also MCCULLOUGH, supra note 84, at 896-97.
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rejected the argument that the President had inherent power to
seize the steel plants.9 The majority concluded that the President's
order infringed upon Congress's lawmaking powers.92 "The
President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be
executed in a manner prescribed by Congress-it directs that a
presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the
President."9 3
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown presents a
classic analysis 94 of the constitutional limits of presidential powers
and his opinion's significance extends well beyond national
security issues. 95 Jackson's opinion emphasizes the important

9 1Youngstown,

343 U.S. at 584,587. Compare the President's lawyers' argument
that "in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the
aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States," and
"Presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under
the Constitution," with Justice Jackson's discussion of "inherent" presidential
powers in his concurring opinion in Youngstown. 343 U.S. at 582, 587, 647.
(Jackson, J., concurring). "The claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential
powers has long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy....
But prudence has counseled that actual reliance on such nebulous claims stop
short of provoking a judicial test." Id. at 647.
92 Id. at 588-89 ("The Constitution did not subject this law-making
power of
Congress to presidential or military supervision or control."); id. at 585 ("The
President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself."). But see HENKIN, supranote 58, at 91
n.15 (suggesting that "lilt is not unfair to assume that the majority of the
Justices in the case might have upheld the President's power had Congress not
acted at all.").
9'Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588.

The executive action we have here originates in the individual
will of the President and represents an exercise of authority
without law. No one, perhaps not even the President, knows the
limits of the power he may seek to exert in this instance and the
parties affected cannot learn the limit of their rights.
Id. at 655 (Jackson J., concurring).
9'KOH, supra note 38, at 105.
9'Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's
three-part analytical framework states:
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interactions of law and human decisions not only in the exercise
and evaluation of Executive authority over national security,9 6 but
also in the day-to-day operation of government.9 7
We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of
practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others
may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the
legal consequences of this factor of relativity.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth), to personify
the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional
under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.... Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system.
Id. at 635-38 (footnote omitted).
96 Jackson cautioned that human beings may often be driven by passions that
cloud reasonable evaluation of the constitutional exercise of presidential power.
Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
" See KOH, supra note 38, at 105 (arguing that "the opinion's enduring value
derives less from its presidential weight than from the unusual clarity with
which it articulates the concept of balanced institutional participation" over
national security affairs); HENKIN supra note 58, at 95 n.24 (arguing that
"Youngstown has not been considered a 'foreign affairs case'.., the majority of
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The actual art of governing under our Constitution
does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of
the power of any of its branches based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context.
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress.9"
One of Jackson's great contributions to American government
flows from his honest appraisal of the difficulties facing those who
attempt to locate, in advance, the institutional limits on authority
emerging from a foundational Constitution.9 9 The legal determination of the President's power depends on the illumination of the
constitutional "zone of twilight"; the distribution of constitutional
authority does not occur in a contextual vacuum. °°
The last few decades have again witnessed the growth of
Executive power over national security policy, in spite of Congress's
attempts to assert its constitutional authority. In the 1970s, Congress
enacted numerous statutes with procedural mechanisms constraining the Executive's unilateral control over national security policy.' 0 '
the Supreme Court did not treat the case as involving the reach of [the
President's] foreign affairs power.").
98 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
99

' 00
101

d. at 635-38.
Id. at 635-39.
KOH, supra note 38, at 46.

In addition to the War Powers Resolution and the Case-Zablocki
Act, the list included the 1977 International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies
Act to govern exercises of emergency economic power; the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 to regulate arms sales; the
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 and
the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance
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These "foreign affairs framework statutes" 10 2 generally included
notification, reporting, and certification requirements designed to
ensure congressional participation in foreign policy decisions. 03 In
short, the legislative reforms were enacted to check Executive
actions by requiring that the President participate with Congress
in policy discussions and provide Congress unfettered access to
important information.0 4 However, resurfacing Cold War tensions
allowed the Executive to reassert its authority by emphasizing
military alternatives that included the need to conduct secret
operations "beneath the banner of 'national security.""' 5 By the
1980s, the Executive had successfully ignored Congress's "procedural strictures" 1 6 and resumed expanding its constitutional

powers. 107
Congressional failure to successfully check Executive
authority eventually resulted in a more formal shift of constitutional power. In the 1981 case, Dames & Moore v. Regan,l "s the

Act to regulate foreign and military aid; the Trade Act of 1974
and the Export Administration Act of 1979 to manage import
and export trade; and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 to oversee
intelligence activities.
Id.
(footnote
omitted).
10
2 Id. at 104.
103 id.

0
1 4 Id.

at 104-05.
O'See Falk, supra note 72, at 212-14 (arguing that "the secret, decisive character

of [the president's] prerogative to shape nuclear weapons policy... without prior
discussion, without guidelines for use, and without notions of accountability, is an
unprecedented erosion of both popular sovereignty and separation of powers").
106 KOH, supra note 38, at 46.
107 Id.; see also Falk, supra note 72, at 215; HENKIN, supra note 58, at 83-84
(describing the presidential tendency to continually test congressional resistance
to expansion of executive power). Falk succinctly describes the inherent limitation
of procedural statutes: "[B]y way of secrecy, the national security doctrine, the
manipulation of information and the media, the projection of bureaucratic
influence, and the undermining of congressional independence by special interest
to lobbies... the main effect [of procedural legislation] is to alter the form of
interaction without touching on its substance." Falk, supra note 72, at 215.
108 Dames & Moore v. Regan 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Supreme Court reinforced the view that Justice Frankfurter
expressed in Youngstown that "a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned . . .may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive
Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II. "1O9 In Dames &
Moore, the Supreme Court upheld President Carter's implementation and President Reagan's subsequent ratification of the terms
of an agreement between Iran and the United States"' which
nullified attachments and suspended all claims against Iran."'
The Court found that the congressional "history of acquiescence in
executive claims settlement" 112 raised a presumption that the
113
President was also authorized to suspend claims against Iran.
Dames & Moore magnified the impact of Congress's past informal
acquiescence to the exercise of greater presidential discretion by
executive orders governing foreign policy." 4 In effect, the Court

453 U.S. at 686, (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
110 Iran released the hostages on January 20, 1981 contingent on the United
109

States' agreement "to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran" and "to
nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further
litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such
claims through binding arbitration." 453 U.S. at 664-65.
11
' 1d. "On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized and
[United States] diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage." Ten days
later, President Carter declared a national emergency and issued an Executive
Order blocking the removal or transfer of property belonging to Iran which was
or
became subject to United States jurisdiction. Id. at 662-63.
112
Id. at 686.
113 453 U.S. at 688-89. The Court acknowledged "that although the [International
Economic Emergency Powers Act] authorized the nullification of the
attachments, it cannot be read to authorize the suspension of the claims." Id. at
675. The Court reasoned that if the President issued an Order interfering with
Congress's constitutional responsibilities, Congress would act; if Congress did
not act, the Court could reasonably conclude that Congress implicitly approved
the President's actions. Id. at 685-88. The Court bolstered its position by noting
that Congress did not express formal disapproval of the President's Orders. Id.
at 686.
114 KOH, supra note 38, at 139-40.
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shifted the burden to Congress to demonstrate that the Constitution's
"zone of twilight" was not within the province of the Executive. 115
Prevailing constitutional doctrine grants the Executive wide
latitude to unilaterally identify situations or events that may
uproot America's institutional structure and to take unilateral
action to improve national security." 6 Ironically, Congress's
attempts to check executive actions and participate more fully in
policy discussions have created practical problems contributing to
the executive's expansion. Congress has become "too decentralized
and democratized to generate its own coherent program of foreign
policy initiatives."" 7 The expansion of executive authority over
national security has created a "growing sense that Congress is
grasping awkwardly after power, but without the will or capacity
to perform successfully ... beyond a distinctly subordinate and
essentially passive role.""' Congress rarely drafts "legislative
'1

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).

116

Professor Koh argues that since the Iran-Contra affair, the Executive has

expanded its constitutional powers over national security with haphazard
resistance from Congress and general tolerance by the Supreme Court. KOH,
supra note 38, at 134-49. Recent history in the areas of "war making, treaty
affairs, emergency economic powers, arms sales, military aid, and covert
operations.., reveals a consistent pattern of executive circumvention of legislative constraint in foreign affairs that stretches back to the Vietnam War and
persists after the Iran-contra affair." Id. at 38; see also id. at 38-64; Sunstein,
ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 453-54 (noting that
"recent Presidents [i.e., Nixon, Carter, Ford and Reagan] have steadily increased
their control of the bureaucracy"). In comparison to members of Congress, the
President is more "visible and hence accountable to the electorate," better suited
to "energize and direct policy," "well-positioned to centraliz[e] and coordinat[e]
foreign policy decisions, and able to respond quickly to foreign and domestic
crises." KOH, supranote 38, at 119. The early stages of the War on Terror appear
likely to favor continued executive expansion by forcing the re-assessment of
traditional notions of executive power over national security; post-9/11, the
execution of national security policy on American soil entered a new dimension.
117 KOH, supra note 38, at 121, (citing Norman J. Ornstein, The Constitutionand
the Sharingof ForeignPolicy Responsibility, in THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS
AND FOREIGN POLICY 61 (E. Muskie et al. eds., 1986)).
'1 8 Falk, supranote 72, at 208. The 9/11 Commission recommended unifying and
strengthening Congressional oversight of the Executive's intelligence network.
See Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, THE 9/11
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controls" that do more than simply "shift executive activity into a
new pattern of evasion."119
Conclusion
That comprehensive and undefined presidential
powers hold both practical advantages and grave
dangers for the country will impress anyone who has
served as legal adviser to a President in time of
transition and public anxiety. While an interval of
detached reflection may temper teachings of that
experience, they probably are a more realistic influence on my views than the conventional materials of
judicial decision which seem
unduly to accentuate
120
doctrine and legal fiction.
Justice Jackson's succinct, pragmatic expression of the
relation between law and executive decisions points to the
limitations of national sustainable development proposals that
attempt to include national security within their broad parameters. No one should contest the dependence of progressive legislation on peace and security,' 2' but we are challenged to imagine the
sustainable development net pragmatically promoting social,
ecological, economic, and security ideals. 22 Jackson's opening
remarks in his Youngstown concurrence remind us that the
formulation and implementation of national security policy is a
distinctly human affair, characterized by human fallibility.

COMMISSION REPORT 417-19 (2004), availableat http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/
reporti91lReport.pdf. "Ofall our recommendations, strengthening Congressional
oversight may be among the most difficult and important." Id. at 419.
119
KOH, supra note 38, at 63. Koh argues that congressional tolerance of expanding executive authority "has institutional roots in legislative myopia, inadequate
drafting, ineffective legislative tools, and an institutional lack of political will."
Id. at 123.
120 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
121
See Dernbach, National SustainableDevelopment, supra note 31, at 88; OUR
COMMON FUTURE, supra note 32, at 290-307.
122 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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National sustainable development proposals depend on novel
understandings of sovereignty and national security that require
diminution in executive authority and greater exercise of congressional will to promote formal, multilateral agreements with other
nation-states. The push to develop new conceptions of national
security and sovereignty are well-intentioned, but they overlook
the critical importance of history and constitutional government to
their development.
In at least one sense, sustainable development advocates
wisely appeal to executive power by integrating security into their
policy proposals. Antiterrorism strategies 123 and variants of
"environmental security" provide an apparent link between
national sustainable development proposals and executive
authority. 124 The Executive is able to legitimately interfere with
private property rights to advance national security interests,
conceivably benefitting environmental programs. 25 The issue,
however, is whether the Executive will exercise democratically its
constitutional power to achieve reasonable social and ecological
objectives in the name of national security. Further expansion of
executive power through modification of traditional understandings of national security and sovereignty move America closer to
a Security State, placing the country at the wrong end of the
democracy-tyranny continuum.
In essence, national sustainable development proposals
undermine their own cause by enhancing executive power. Policies
attempting to integrate security, economic, ecological, and social
equity goals risk increasing executive control over social and
ecological issues under the guise of national security. This raises
the bar on public access to information bearing on socio-ecological
policies,' 26 shields the executive branch from accountability for its
decisions, and erodes deliberative democratic institutions. The
President's ability to lawfully and expeditiously terminate
123

See, e.g., supra notes 37 and 62.
supra notes 64-66.
See supra Part II, discussing Curtiss-Wright, Youngstown, and Dames &

124See
125

Moore. The "War on Terror" may eventually justify the seizure of a religious
establishment or private business in spite of the result in Youngstown.
126 See, e.g., Salkin, supra note 25.
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business practices or advance social policies in the name of
national security is an attractive "hook" for sustainability development advocates, but the long-term institutional cost of contributing
to the growth of the Security State far surpasses the short-term
rewards. 27
III.

THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF CORRUPTION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted
by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of
the governmental powers among three departments,
to save the people from autocracy.
-Justice Brandeis in Myers v. United States2 '

127

See, e.g., Dames & Moore, supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text; Regan

468 U.S. at 240-42 (holding that restrictions on travel-related transactions with
Cuba did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
Highlighting "the traditional deference to executive judgment in the realm of
foreign policy," the Court held that "there is an adequate basis under the Due
Process Clause to sustain the President's decision to curtail, by restricting
travel, the flow of hard currency to Cuba that could be used in support of Cuban
adventurism." Id. at 223. Writing in dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized
presidents' use of "emergencies" to expand executive authority. Id. at 248-49.
It is clear that Congress intended to curtail the discretionary
authority over foreign affairs that the President had accumulated because of past "emergencies" that no longer fit Congress'
conception of that term. To accomplish this goal, Congress
amended the TWEA [Trading with the Enemy Act] and enacted
the IEEPA [International Emergency Economic Powers Act]
....The substantive reach of the President's power under the
IEEPA is slightly narrower than it had been under the TWEA,
and Congress placed several procedural restrictions on the
President's exercise of the national-emergency powers, including
congressional consultation, review, and termination.
Id.
128 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (quoted in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 614 (Frankfurter,
J.,
concurring)).
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The infusion of power into the Executive and its agencies is
proving unsustainable for the reasons James Madison advanced
over two centuries ago. 129 The President exercises power over the
regulatory apparatus by appointing agency "heads" 3 ' who promulgate regulations implementing the Executive's legislative-policy
agenda.' 3 ' Their legal and political decisions affect environmental
law and regulation through a process largely devoid of any practical "checks" from government's constitutional branches. Congress
insufficiently oversees environmental agency policies on behalf of
the American public, thus allowing administrative agencies to
become the Executive's legislative authority over environmental
issues. 32 National environmental policies striving toward socioecological goals will reverse course unless Congress and the
courts compel environmental regulatory agencies to balance their
tendency toward economic favoritism with practices respecting
collective, socio-ecological values.'33
121 See infra Part III.A. through Part III.C.
130

See Farina, supra note 38, at 504.
The appointment of agency heads illustrates how custom has
combined with the Constitution to strengthen the President's
hand. Control over the power to appoint key government
officials was an issue of intense concern for the Framers. Article
II, section 2 of the Constitution, providing for presidential
appointment of major officers with Senate consent, represented
a deeply considered and much debated attempt to balance
executive and legislative involvement in the selection process.

Id.
131

See infra Part III.C.

See infra Part IV.A., discussing the Bush Administration's use of EPA's
rulemaking authority to accomplish objectives unavailable through Congress.
When Congress did not enact the Bush Administration's Clear Skies legislation,
the Administration directed the EPA to change the administrative rules and
adopt the Administration's legislative preferences-a classic example of
"backdoor" (and closed door) legislation. Id.
133 Agencies' shift in emphasis should attend to the ecological processes essential
for social well-being. See COMM. OF SCIENTISTS, U.S. DEP'T OFAGRI., SUSTAINING
132

THE PEOPLE'S LANDS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STEWARDSHIP OF THE NATIONAL
FORESTS AND GRASSLANDS INTO THE NEXT CENTURY 19 (1999), available at

http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/includes/cosreport/Committee%20of%
20Scientists%2OReport.htm [hereinafter COMM. OF SCIENTISTS REPORT].
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In sum, although Congress theoretically holds ultimate power over the content of regulatory policy, in
fact the President has a singular ability to exploit the
opportunity for social and economic policy making
presented by broadly delegative statutes . . . [F]ew
observers would disagree that the President is likely
to come out significantly ahead of any other branch in
harnessing and directing the stream of regulatory
3
policy-making power.1 1
National sustainable development proposals attempting to
integrate idealistic goals downplay the importance of the institutional framework necessary to achieve fundamental regulatory
change that advances collective environmental values. In the
absence of specific measures to realign the power structure affecting regulatory decisions, the Executive will continue to dominate
administrative agencies' legislative power over the implementation of national environmental policy. 135 Agency administrators
function without the accountability necessary to ensure that their
decisions reflect a deliberative process advancing environmental
legislations' values. Administrators are too far removed from
Congress and the electoral process to be true representatives of the

is4 Farina, supra note 38, at 510.
135 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487-88 (2001) (Stevens
& Souter, JJ., concurring).
The Court has two choices. We could choose to articulate our
ultimate disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that
the power delegated to the EPA is "legislative" but nevertheless
conclude that the delegation is constitutional because adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing statute.
Alternatively, we could pretend, as the Court does, that the
authority delegated to the EPA is somehow not "legislative
power." Despite the fact that there is language in our opinions
that supports the Court's articulation of our holding, I am
persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what
we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency
rulemaking authority is "legislative power."
Id. at 488.
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people's interests.'36 Sustainable development advocates should
shift their resources from overreaching, national integrative
platforms to a focused, institutional strategy designed to restore
constitutional values 3 7 to the administration of environmental law
and policy. 3 '
This Part also turns to history and the New Deal to
illuminate the conflict between environmental agency autonomy
and Madisonian republicanism. It begins with a discussion of
Madison's notion of "checks and balances"-designed to limit
corruption in government-before examining the historical
justifications for agency authority. 3 9 The New Deal Era altered the

136

See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 447 ("The second problem is that agency

actors lack electoral accountability and often are not responsive to the public as
a whole. Because of the absence of the usual electoral safeguards, agencies are
peculiarly susceptible to factional pressure and often likely to act in their own
interests."); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1688 (1975) ("The ultimate
problem is to control and validate the exercise of essentially legislative powers
by administrative agencies that do not enjoy the formal legitimation of oneperson one-vote election.").
137
See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 94 (1994) (arguing that the "central values of the Framers'
original executive" were "accountability and avoidance of factionalism").
18 This Article relies on a broader understanding of "institutions" than Professor
Dernbach explains, but his views nonetheless point to the importance of the
institutional issue. See Dernbach, NationalSustainableDevelopment, supranote
31, at 112 ("There is no permanent institutional mechanism (in the executive
branch or in Congress) that is used to foster, encourage, or coordinate
sustainable development activities."); id. at 115-18 (noting the absence of "an
institutional basis for further integration of social, economic, and environmental
policy in the United States"); id. at 118 ("There is no institutional mechanism,
analogous in some ways to an independent federal agency, that is capable of
ensuring any kind of long term thinking or action for sustainable
development.").
139 We should not underestimate the importance of Madison's contribution to the
Constitution nor his relevance to current controversies in environmental law
and regulation.
Decisions about the nature and direction of a constitutional
democracy cannot be made in the abstract and acontextually;
they must appeal to reasons. Interpretation of the meaning of
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tripartite system of government by constructing politically
independent, administrative agencies that relied upon unrealistic
conceptions of administrative agencies' expertise to identify and
correct socio-economic problems in society. The Environmental
Era's legislation restrained agency authority and reorganized the
institutional framework governing public and private acts affecting
the environment. However, current regulatory institutions unreasonably support agency discretion, especially in the context of an
agency's alleged reliance upon its scientific or technical expertise to
resolve areas of purported uncertainty.' ° Administrative agencies'
legislative authority displaces Madisonian institutions that were
designed to inhibit corruption, and it also encourages executive
exploitation of agency discretion to achieve political goals that are
4
at odds with environmental legislative purposes.1 '
A.

James Madison's Remedy for PoliticalCorruption
We cannot be too often reminded that constitutions
are not literary compositions but ways of ordering
142
society.

Madison's constitutional position emerged from his
"philosophical conservatism, largely absent from Jefferson's
formal thought, in which the dead and the living-as well as the
past, the present, and the future--were inextricably and on the

the relevant tradition is always an important method of social
criticism; an understanding of inherited beliefs is an inevitable
part of the project of constitutionalism. The future of American
public law depends in significant part on the way that its
tradition is understood-a theme highly congenial to
republicanism. And the republican elements of the framers'
thought deserve credit for helping to launch many reforms that
were in retrospect highly desirable.
Sunstein, Beyond Republican Revival, supra note 41, at 1563 (footnote omitted).
140

See infra Part IV.

141

Id.

142

FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT

39 (1930).
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whole happily bound together.""4 Madison envisioned a republic
regulated by a system of institutional checks and balances that
would support deliberation among policymakers and stifle natural
human tendencies to seek money (or other forms of property) and
power.'" The government's three branches would functionally
check one another's ambitions through mechanisms designed to
ensure accountability, limited but ultimately equal power, and
deliberative processes honoring minority and majority viewpoints. 145 His political thought was grounded in empirical work
that examined the problems of government under the Articles of
Confederation. Madison's Vices of the PoliticalSystem of the United
States 46 focused on the State's failure to follow the Articles'

DREw

R.

McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 58-59 (1989).
144 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
143

1961).
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
Id.
141
14

Id. at 320-25.

1JAMES MADISON,

Vices ofthe PoliticalSystem of the United States (April 1787)
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69-80 (The Library of America 1990) [hereinafter
MADISON: WRITINGS]. Madison drafted a list of 12 "vices" characterizing State
actions.
1. Failure of the States to comply with the Constitutional
requisitions.
2. Encroachments by the States on the federal authority.
3. Violations of the law of nations and of treaties.
4. Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other.
5. Want of concert in matters where common interest requires it.
6. Want of guaranty to the States of their Constitutions & laws
against internal violence.
7. Want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the
Government of the Confederacy.
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provisions or acts of Congress, 4 7 and anticipated his more comprehensive contributions to the Federalist Papers.
The republicans in late-19th century America considered
politics to be essentially deliberative. 148 Madison's analysis of
states' "vices" and the complaints of those sharing his contempt for
states' administration of public policy 149 raised concerns about the
8. Want of ratification by the people of the articles of
Confederation.
9. Multiplicity of laws in the several States.
10. Mutability of the laws of the States.
11. Injustice of the laws of States.
12. Impotence of the laws of the States.
Id. Madison's "vices" anticipated his arguments in the Federalist Papers. Jack
N. Rakove, Law and PoliticalCulture: The MadisonianMoment, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 473, 480 (1988) [hereinafter Law and PoliticalCulture].
The heart of the Madisonian program... [is] the way in which
his observations about the 'vices' of state politics influenced his
thinking on four major issues: the nature of representation in
the extended republic; the demand, closely related to the
representation issue, for the apportionment of seats in both
houses of a bi-cameral Congress; the need to enhance the
authority of the weaker branches of government, the executive
and judiciary, against an overreaching legislature; and most
difficult of all, the basis and extent of the supremacy that he
clearly hoped the union would henceforth enjoy over the states
in the "compound republic" of a federal system.
Id.
147

Id.at 479. Madison's "analysis of the problem of faction within the states was
decidedly empirical and experiential, in the dual sense of lessons drawn from
both the evidence of recorded history and the experience of republican
government in America since 1776." See also Sunstein, Interest Groups in

American Public Law, supra note 50, at 40.
141 Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at
31

("Dialogue and discussion among the citizenry were critical features in the
governmental process.").
149 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate
and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private
faith and of public and personal liberty, that our governments
are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the
conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules ofjustice and the rights of the
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future of deliberation in the infant Nation. He was alarmed by
State legislators' unchecked and unethical exercise of discretion,
illustrated in part by powerful constituents' influence over legislative decisions. 50 Madison's investigation revealed that legislators'
self-interested representation 151 produced a "multiplicity of laws"'52
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority.... These must be chiefly, if not wholly,
effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious
spirit has tainted our public administration.
Id.
150 Madison did not confine his displeasure to the legislators-a significant cause
of states' unjust legislation was "lies among the people themselves." MADISON:
WRITINGS, supra note 146, at 76. See Rakove, supra note 146, at 492 (arguing
that "in Madison's analysis, since most wrongful legislation could be traced not
to legislative irresponsibility but.., to the very fidelity with which lawmakers
were obeying the wishes of interested majorities, it was naive to expect the
community to mobilize itself against the excesses of its duly elected
representatives").
151 Madison identified three motives responsible for citizens' aspiration to
represent the States' people in "legislative Councils:" ambition, personal interest,
and public good; ambition and personal interest were "proved by experience to
be [the] most prevalent." MADISON: WRITINGS supra note 146, at 75-76.
Hence the candidates who feel them, particularly, [personal
interest], are most industrious, and most successful in pursuing
their object: and forming often a majority in the legislative
Councils, with interested views, contrary to the interest, and
views, of their Constituents, join in a perfidious sacrifice of the
latter to the former.
Id.
at
76.
152
Id. at 74-75.
As far as laws are necessary, to mark with precision the duties
of those who are to obey them, and to take from those who are
to administer them a discretion, which might be abused, their
number is the price of liberty. As far as the laws exceed this
limit, they are a nuisance: a nuisance of the most pestilent kind.
Try the Codes of the several States by this test, and what a
A review of the
luxuriancy of legislation do they present ....
several codes will shew that every necessary and useful part of
the least voluminous of them might be compressed into one
tenth of the compass, and at the same time be rendered tenfold
as perspicuous.
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often characterized by their "mutability."153 The injustice resulting
from the multiplicity and mutability of the states' laws caused
Madison to "question the fundamental principle of republican
Government, that the majority who rule in such Governments, are
the safest Guardians both of public Good and of private rights." 54
Madison analyzed the problem of interest groups' corrupt
influence on legislation, and legislators' susceptibility to corruption, through the prism of government's responsibilities to its
citizenry. Neither a pure democracy nor a traditional republican
government was likely to prevent an empowered group from
organizing with an objective "adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." 55 Moreover, legislators' corrupt political practices
supported Madison's arguments that education and civic virtue
were insufficient to restrain a majority from violating the rights of
a minority.'56 He focused on government's fundamental obligation
to protect liberty, not only as individual liberty (as liberty is often

153

Id. at 75.

This evil [i.e., mutability] is intimately connected with [the
multiplicity of laws] yet deserves a distinct notice as it
emphatically denotes a vicious legislation. We daily see laws
repealed or superseded, before any trial can have been made of
their merits: and even before a knowledge of them can have
reached the remoter districts within which they were to operate.
MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 146, at 75.
[Madison] decried the abundance and inconsistency of the laws
which, by shifting as rapidly as public opinion and the unstable
coalitions of interests in the legislatures, tended to sow discord
and confusion among the people. This unsteadiness in the laws
often reflected, moreover, the narrow, illiberal, even ignorant
views of inexperienced legislators who seemed alarmingly
oblivious both to private rights and to any broader notion of the
public good.
MCCOY, supra note 143, at 40-41.
1.4 MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 146, at 75.
15" Id. at 78.
"'56 See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 40.
"Such devices would be unable to overcome the natural self-interest of men and
women, even in their capacity as political actors." Id. (citation omitted).
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understood today) but also as collective liberty." 7 The "common
interest was not. . . simply the sum or consensus of the particular
interests that made up the community. It was rather an entity in
itself, prior to and distinct from the various private interests of
groups and individuals." 58
Madison's revolutionary approach to republican government
rests on a novel institutional structure designed to preserve the
notion of the State as a moral actor responsible for advancing
collective liberty to cultivate individual liberty: "Indeed, the
private liberties of individuals depended upon their collective
public liberty."'59 Republican institutions' aimed to minimize
government officials' tendency toward self-interested corruption
and to resist factional subversion of public liberty.'6 ° Factions"'
157

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787, at

58 (1998).
158

Id.

59

' Id. at 61.
"'See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 149; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
supra note 144; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supranote
50, at 32.
[Tihe problem of faction assumes a distinct form and has a
distinct solution. The problem is rooted in corruption: the
elimination of civic virtue and the pursuit of self-interest by
political actors. If corruption occurs, groups seeking to use
government power to promote their own private ends might
come to dominate the political process. If private groups were
permitted to subvert government in this way, political power
would supplant political discussion and debate. Corruption thus
threatens to undermine the republican conception of politics.
Id.
161 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78.
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority ofthe whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.
Id. at 78. The Constitutional form of government should "secure the public good
and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and ...preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government." Id. at 80. Madison argued that the
causes of factions are "sown in the nature of man," but he did not conclude
that human nature would necessarily corrupt all political processes. Id. at 79.
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generally developed from unequal property distributions placing
individuals' interests in wealth preservation and enhancement in
162
varying degrees of opposition to society's collective well-being.
Legislators responded to factional influence with legislation
serving to "judge"163 among competing special interests. The
"mutability"'" and "multiplicity" 165 of laws characterizing State
codes represented the outcome of "deals" orchestrated by legislators, violating their ethical and legal obligations to serve all
the people.
Madison argued that the Constitution should provide a
framework resisting the concentration of executive, legislative, and
judicial power in the same branch. 166 Factional threats to liberty
and governmental stability led Madison to favor a Constitution
" 1 67
sharply curtailing legislative power; mere "parchment barriers
would never suffice to check a "legislative department... everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power

"[F]ederalists rejected the notion that political actions were inevitably selfinterested: 'As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in
human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.'"
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, supranote 50, at 43 (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 55 at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (P. Ford ed., 1898)).
162 Madison recognized the need to "regulate" powerful propertied interests in
order to protect collective liberty. The origin of most factious conflict within
society "has been the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of property....
[producing] distinct interests in society." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79. "Shall
domestic manufacturers be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on
foreign manufacturers? Are questions which would be differently decided by the
landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with sole regard
to justice and the public good." Id. at 80. The Constitutional form of government
should "secure the public good and private rights against the danger of... a
faction, and... preserve the spirit and the form of popular government." Id.
163 THE FEDERALIST

No. 10, at 79 ("[Y]et what are many of the most important

acts of legislation but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning
the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?").
164 See supra notes 153-54
165 See supra note 152.
16See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51.
167 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308.
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into its impetuous vortex." 6 s The new government would advance
the collective liberty by checking public officials' potential for
corruption through an institutional structure "supplying, by
16 9
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives."
Madison proposed countering the strength of the legislature by
dividing the Congress into different political bodies that would
serve different constituencies for different terms, thereby minimizing their ability to coalesce into a single body and satisfy legislators' natural thirst for power. 17 The Supreme Court was responsible for ensuring that the implementation of laws was consistent
with the Constitution and with congressional purpose.' 7 '
16

8Id.

at 308-09.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of
these departments in the constitution of the government, and to
trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit
of power? This is the security which appears to have been
principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American
constitutions. But experience assures us that the efficacy of the
provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more
adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble
against the more powerful members of the government. The
legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.

Id.
169 The members of each branch should have the "necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.... Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22; see also
Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and JudicialReview, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV.
159, 163 (1957) ("The fear of final power is inherent in the concept of separation
of powers, the basic intent of which is to prevent any agency of government from
becoming strong enough to endanger public liberty.").
170 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322. "The remedy for this inconveniency is to
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different
modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each
other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on
the society will admit." Id.
171 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton).
[C] ourts were designed to be an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
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Although Madison's revolutionary views of republicanism
developed in a socio-political, economic, and technological society
far removed from today's world, his discussions of corruption in
government are all the more remarkable for withstanding the test
of time. Madison observed and publicized human tendencies
toward corruption that are no less prevalent today than they were
in the 18th century. His system of checks and balances was
undermined, however, by the New Deal's modification of republican institutions to increase the government's efficiency. 172 New
Dealers' motives were pure, they hoped to restore Americans'
economic and social welfare, but the institutional changes produced unintended consequences for environmental legislation
enacted decades later. 17 3 The New Deal's institutional remnants
are currently manipulated to sacrifice environmental legislation's
socio-ecological values in favor of short-term economic interests.1
B.

The Genesis of Administrative Agency Power

The 20th century ushered in "the first grant of substantial
rule-making, rule-enforcement, and adjudicative powers to
executive offices and independent administrative agencies." 75 In
his classic article, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, Professor Stewart designates the widely accepted doctrine
that emerged near the turn of the 20th century "the traditional

the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by
the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them
to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
Id.

SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 22-24.
See supra Part II.
174 See Kysar, supra note 34, at 703. Kysar argues that environmental statutes
"and their judicial interpretations, may be seen as reflecting a concern that
ecological values do not receive due consideration under a strict cost-benefit
analysis. To combat such potential shortchanging, legislators seek to remove
certain
environmental goods from utilitarian balancing altogether." Id.
175
Id. at 40-41.
172e
173
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model of administrative law." 76 Initially, an administrative agency
was viewed "as a mere transmission belt for implementing
legislative directives in particular cases;"' 77 the prospect of agency
mistake or abuse was presumably checked by the judiciary. 7 '
However, government's inability to corral industry's influence over
public policy or to effectively address the Great Depression's
injustice led to the New Deal's restructuring of the Executive's
administrative authority, paralleling changes in Executive power
over national security. 7 9 New Dealers targeted government's
176

Stewart, supra note 136, at 1669.
The traditional model of administrative law ... has sought to

reconcile the competing claims of governmental authority and
private autonomy by prohibiting official intrusions on private
liberty or property unless authorized by legislative directives. To
promote this end, the traditional model affords judicial review
in order to cabin administrative discretion within statutory
bounds, and requires agencies to follow decisional procedures
designed to promote the accuracy, rationality, and reviewability
of agency application of legislative directives.
Id. at 1669-70. Four essential elements, characterize the traditional model:
1. The imposition of administratively determined sanctions on
private individuals must be authorized by the legislature
through rules which control agency action.
2. The decisional procedures followed by the agency must be
such as will tend to ensure the agency's compliance with
requirement (1). If agencies may exercise delegated powers only
in accordance with legislative directives, and if effective
limitation on administrative power is not to be more theoretical
than real, agency procedures must be designed to promote the
accurate, impartial, and rational application of legislative
directives to given cases or classes of cases.
3. The decisional processes of the agency must facilitate judicial
review to ensure compliance with requirements (1) and (2).
4. Judicial review must be available to ensure compliance with
requirements (1) and (2).
Id. at 1672-74.
177 Stewart, supra note 136, at
1675.
17 8Id. at 1676. The "transmission belt" analogy lost steam as it became clear that
Congress's vague statutes lacked the specific directives necessary to proscribe
agency
discretion. Id. at 1676-77.
179 See supra Part II.
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administrative dysfunction, proposing a novel form of administrapowerful, insulated Executive
tion constructed around a politically
80
and its expert administrators.
The New Deal's institutional program was premised on
dissatisfaction with the traditional constitutional framework-the
common law, checks and balances, and traditional notions of
federalism.'' New Dealers, led by FDR, proposed a number of
structural changes intended to advance America's economic
condition (and prevent another depression) by breaking down
stereotypes and accepted wealth distributions, placing more power
and responsibility in an enlarged presidency served by new
administrative agencies, and shifting commercial power and
responsibility from the states to the federal government.8 2
Proponents argued that a strong Executive would benefit society
socially and economically by enhancing the pace and effectiveness
of government change.8 3 The dramatic expansion of executive
powers and the creation of a multitude of administrative agencies
democracy and
represented a philosophical shift from deliberative
84
system.
balances"
and
"checks
Madison's
In short, a system of centralized and unified powers,
bypassing the states and the judiciary, seemed
indispensable to allow for dramatic and frequent
governmental regulation. In the new circumstances
the system of checks and balances no longer appeared
to be a necessary safeguard of private property and
0James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 363-64 (1976).

181 Id. at 18-24. The New Deal resulted in a "dramatic increase in the power of
the President," and an extensive "grant of authority to regulatory agencies,"
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 440.
182 See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 20-25;
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 423-25.
...
See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 22-23.
184 Id. at 24. "We might use the term 'New Deal Constitutionalism' to describe the
resulting structure of social and economic regulation-a structure that renovated
the original constitutional regime in favor of new understandings of individual
rights, checks and balances, the role of the judiciary, and federalism." Id.
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liberty from factualism, but instead-and this was
the crucial point-a faction-driven obstacle to social
change in the public interest.185
Administrative agencies' extensive discretionary authority
was justified by the perception that agencies would be "politically
insulated, self-starting, and technically sophisticated. " 18 6 An
optimistic outlook on the complicated nature of the Era's problems
fueled the notion that agencies would function as "neutral experts."8 7
Administrative agency design combined the constitutional functions
of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches,"18 in part due
to a culturally naive understanding of the relationship between
pragmatic knowledge and political decisions. The "expert model of
administration [assumed that] . . .government officials had the
requisite technical expertise, were free from any bias, and would do
the right thing under an unfathomable array of circumstances."8 9
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") institutionalized the mid20th century's "expert model" of administration, granting agencies
broad legal authority subject to limited judicial review. 90

185

Id. at 23.
See Freedman, supra note 180 at 363-65.

18 Philip J. Harter, In Search of Goldilocks: Democracy, Participation,and
Government, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 116-17 (2002); see also SUNSTEIN,
AFTER THE RiGHTs REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 23.
188
See SUNSTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 23 ("The new

agencies often combined the traditionally separated powers of legislation,
adjudication, and execution; and they often were given broad policymaking
authority by Congress."); see also Stewart, supranote 136, at 1677 n.30 (quoting
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The
mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all
recognized classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which
we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a
disordered bed.")).
189 Harter, supra note 187, at 117.
190 The APA generally requires courts to approve agency decisions unless
the challenged action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2000).
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The "expert model" was an integral piece of FDR's New
economic recovery program and his proposal for a "second
Bill of Rights." 92 The "second Bill of Rights" advanced collective
values and other New Deal reforms intended to offset factional
oppression of individuals' social and economic rights. 9 3 The
Deal' 9 '

191

See Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 423

n.6. Sunstein includes an important comment from FDR:
President Roosevelt described the origin of the term "New Deal"
in this way:
The word "Deal" implied that the government itself was going to
use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objectives
rather than stand by and hope that general economic laws alone
would attain them. The word "New" implied that a new order of
things designed to benefit the great mass of our farmers,
workers and business men would replace the old order of special
privilege in a Nation which was completely and thoroughly
disgusted with the existing dispensation.
Id. (citing 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE
YEAR OF CRISIS, 1933, at 5 (1938)).
192
See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION supranote 18 at 21-22, (citing
F.D. ROOSEVELT, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11,
1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
VICTORY AND THE THRESHOLD OF PEACE, 1944-45, at 41 (1969)).
FDR's "second Bill of Rights:"
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or
shops or farms or mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing
and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a
return which will give him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination
by monopolies at home or abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to
achieve and enjoy good health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old
age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education.
Id.
193 See id.
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liberal exercise of agency discretion was necessary to "restore
health to the various sectors of the economy for which they were
responsible." 94 The economy was no longer perceived as an
invisible hand surfacing through market ordering and market
values; regulatory experts would re-organize the institutional
framework for business and government decisions to enhance
1 95
policies grounded in collective social values.
C.

The EnvironmentalEra-QuestioningAgency Authority

The expert model of administration was still in its infancy
when the 1960s and '70s marked a "revolution in the category of
legally protected rights-a revolution that built on and materially
expanded the New Deal."'96 The environmental movement was an
See Stewart, supra note 136 at 1677-78 (footnote omitted); see also James 0.
Freedman, Expertise and the AdministrativeProcess, 28ADMIN. L. REV. 363,364
(1976) ("Those who rationalized the New Deal's regulatory initiatives regarded
expertise and specialization as the particular strengths of the administrative
process.").
195 See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 20. FDR's
social programs were grounded in wealth distribution values not unlike those
advanced by anti-poverty positions tied to sustainable development proposals;
see also Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 444.
There was a powerful Madisonian dimension to the New Deal
enthusiasm for insulated and technically expert agencies. Just as
the framers designed the original constitutional system in part to
insulate national representatives in order to increase the likelihood of deliberative government, so the New Deal conception of
administration sought to insulate public officials in order to
protect governmental processes against the distortions produced
by factionalism. In both the original system and the New Deal
reformulation, reformers believed that protection from factionalism, through a measure of insulation, was highly desirable.
Id.
196 Id.
at 24. President Nixon may be largely responsible for the notion that
environmental values should be recognized as rights: "Clean air, clean water,
open spaces-these should again be the birthright of every American."
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 29 (quoting the
Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 22, 1970), in PUBLIC
114

PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: RICHARD

M. NIXON 8, 13 (1970)). "The need for an
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integral part of the revolution that "constituted an expression of
demand for new research in science, acceptance of new social
values, and technological change."197 Congress institutionalized the
movement's core values with a comprehensive series of legislative
acts. 9 ' Congress recognized that government action is necessary
to overcome free-market consumption patterns that "may have
long-term, world transforming effects reflect[ing] a kind of
collective myopia in the form of emphasis on short-term considerations at the expense of the future."'99 Courts established the
legitimacy of environmental legislation and altered the institutional framework governing public and private sector decisions
affecting the environment. °°
During the Environmental Era, Congress rolled back New
Deal delegations to administrative agencies with legislative
measures compelling agencies to execute specific, timely acts and
to remain functionally accountable to Congress.2 ' Congressional
experience since the New Deal suggested sharply curtailing
administrative autonomy to avoid the self-interested representation and factionalism targeted by Madisonian republicanism.2 2

active federal role in protecting the environment is among the most striking
themes of the Nixon presidency; it recurs throughout his statements between
1969 and 1972." Id. at n.25.
'9 HAYS, supra note 2, at 488.
8

's

See supra notes 6-22 and accompanying text.

199 SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION,

supra note 18, at 59.

2oo See Hays, supra note 2, at 488.
201
See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note

18, at 29.

Id. at 139 (describing Madisonian republicanism as "designed to ensure a
measure of deliberation in government" and giving rise to the "norm [that]
proscribes legislative efforts to transfer resources from one group to another
simply because of political power"); see also Stewart, supra note 136, at 1684.
Once the function of agencies is conceptualized as adjusting
competing private interests in light of their configuration in a
given factual situation and the policies reflected in relevant
statutes, it is not possible to legitimate agency action either by
the "transmission belt" theory of the traditional model, or the
"expertise" model of the New Deal period.
202
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The legislative branch reasserted its constitutional relationship
with the people through enhanced supervision and monitoring of
agency decisions. 211 "In this respect, Congress rejected the institutional learning of the New Deal and produced a partial revival
of original notions of checks and balances. It did so, however,
without rejecting the New Deal belief in active governmental
controls in the interest of economic productivity and protection of
the disadvantaged."2 °4
The judiciary also raised the bar on the legitimate exercise
of administrative discretion, reacting against factionalism and the
complementary problem of self-interested representation.2 5
Commentators generally agree that agency capture played a
significant role in the courts' aggressive posture toward agency
discretion between the mid-1960s and the late '70s (or early
°6 The matter is more complicated than depicted by cursory
'80s).2
Id. (citing Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of JudicialResponsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 472 (1954)).
203 SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 29-30.
204
Id.at 30.
20
Id. at 99; see also id. at 98. ("IT] here is no question that well-organized groups
have often exerted a disproportionate influence over the regulatory process,
partly because of their political capital and organizing capacities, partly because
of the agencies' ultimate dependence on good relations with them and on the
information that only they can provide."); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-53, 105967 (1997) (discussing the "capture theory era" of administrative law between
1967-1983 and its impact upon the relations between administrative agencies
and courts).
206
See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTs REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 98-99; see
also Merrill, supra note 205, at 1059-67.
[C] apture theory also suggests that aggressive judicial oversight
and control of agencies is needed in order to counteract the
distortions of the administrative process introduced by interest
group capture and other pathologies. Specifically, by forcing
agencies to adopt an administrative process that is more open
and to give greater consideration to underrepresented viewpoints in that process, courts may be able to counteract the
distortions emphasized by the theory.
If capture theory was indeed the dominant attitude toward the
administrative state in the period from roughly 1967 to 1983,
then we would expect to see a very different administrative

426

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 30:371

versions of "capture" theory,2 °7 but enhanced agency insulation and
authority has often been a "source of vulnerability to the pressures
of well-organized groups."28 During the initial stages of designing
common law during this period. Generally speaking, the balance
of power should shift perceptibly from agencies to courts. Thus,
courts should tilt toward an expansive view of the availability of
review and perhaps also a more intrusive scope of review.
Id. at 1052. Although he wrote his treatise in the middle of what Thomas Merrill
calls the "capture theory era [i.e., 1967-1983]," Professor Stewart described the
tendency among observers to adopt "capture theory" explanations for agency
behaviors.
Critics have repeatedly asserted, with a dogmatic tone that
reflects settled opinion, that in carrying out broad legislative
directives, agencies unduly favor organized interests, especially
the interests of regulated or client business firms and other
organized groups at the expense of diffuse, comparatively
unorganized interests such as consumers, environmentalists and
the poor.
Stewart, supra note 136 at 1684-85 (footnotes omitted).
[T]he fact that agency policies may tend to favor regulated
interests does not in itself demonstrate that such policies are
unfair or unjustified, since protection of regulated interests may
be implicit in the regulatory scheme established by Congress.
Nonetheless, the critique of agency discretion as unduly
favorable to organized interests--particularly regulated or client
firms-has sufficient power and verisimilitude to have achieved
widespread contemporary acceptance.
Id. at 1687.
207 Stewart, supra note 136 at 1684-87 ("At its crudest, this thesis [claims that]
...administrations are systematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by the
business firms within their orbit of responsibility, whether regulatory or
promotional."); see also Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra
note 50, at 449 (noting that "the precise sources and nature of the 'capture'
phenomenon are sharply contested").
20 8Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the
New Deal, supranote 50, at 449. James
Willard Hurst eloquently and succinctly describes the political and constitutional
problems legislative bodies cause by placing administrative agencies in the line
of interest group fire.
By sweeping delegations of policy discretion, both Congress and
state legislatures deflected from themselves onto their delegates
much of the pressure that special interests otherwise would turn
onto the legislators ....
In a given agency there were fewer
responsible actors to spread the burden of special pressures; the
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an environmental regulatory scheme, the regulated industries'
employees often know more about the technical practices affecting
environmental quality than most regulators.2 °9 Agencies lack the
resources of regulated industry and depend on regulated groups for
information,210 cooperation,21 ' and even policy development and
political support.21 2 Agencies may also tend to become "regulation
minded" 2 3 and sacrifice flexibility in management to maintain the
status quo balance of power among regulated interests.2 4

agency specialization meant that its heads had fewer
opportunities to play pressure in one program area against
pressure in another; agency officials had no general voter
constituency out of which to build political capital to offset the
economic prestige and arguments that a regulated group could
bring to bear.... Back of the constitutional doctrine that said a
legislature might not delegate powers save within carefully
defined standards to guide and confine its delegate lay practical
political wisdom: the legislature should not expose a separate
agency to more heat of interest combat than it fairly could be
expected to bear.
JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 151(1977).
209 See Stewart, supra note 136, at 1686.
210 See id. at 1686; see also OFFICE OF THE EPA INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. No.

2005-P-00003, ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF MERCURY EMISSIONS NEEDED BEFORE
EPA FINALIZES RULES FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2005), available
at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050203-2005-P-00003.pdf (discussing
EPA's process of acquiring information from industry to assess the availability
of mercury-specific emissions control technologies).
211 See Stewart, supra note 136, at 1685.
212
Id.at 1686.
21 3
Id. at 1685.
214 See id. at
1684-87; SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18,
at 99 ("Administrative officials are often resistant to change as well, tending to
resolve conflicts among competing [interest] groups not necessarily in favor of
those with the best arguments, but instead those whose demands require the
least drastic departure from established responses."); Sunstein, InterestGroups
in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 74-75 (noting that "administrative
inaction is often produced by the capture of governmental power by wellorganized groups-often the very industry the relevant agency is entrusted to
regulate," and concluding that "political checks are insufficient safeguards
against that prospect").
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Courts reinforced the doctrine that judicial review should
check administrators' tendency to favor private, economic interests
in decisions215 by aggressively defending the collective values
Congress intended to protect with legislation. 216 The judiciary
promoted incremental, institutional change through the interpretation and application of the APA's arbitrary and capricious
standard, culminating with the "most important doctrinal innovation in administrative law,"217 the hard look doctrine.218 The hard

215

See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 65

("In both administrative and constitutional law, judge-made doctrines, applicable to legislators and bureaucrats, are designed to ensure against the dangers
of faction.").
216 See SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION supra note 18, at 30.
217 Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 61.
218 Compare Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2150 n.210
(2004), describing "the elements that constitute the modern hard look' paradigm
of reasoned decisionmaking:"
[A]gencies have been required to adhere to their own
regulations, to explain deviations from past precedents, to
disclose to interested parties the factual assumptions underlying
their decisions, and to respond to material comments by parties
who object to the proposed course of action, citing e.g., Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 31 (1983) (requiring agency to give reasoned explanation for
rejecting alternatives to proposed action); Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973)
(requiring agency to explain departure from prior norms); Conn.
Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525,
530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring that agency disclose technical
basis for proposed rules in order to afford meaningful basis for
comment). The result has been vigorous judicial review that
serves as a check on agency action, without regard to whether
Congress has laid down any particular statutory standard to
structure the agency's action.
With Cass Sunstein's description of the "hard-look doctrine" in 1987:
[T]he hard-look doctrine requires agencies to consider all
statutorily relevant factors, to justify departures from past
practices, to furnish detailed explanations of their decisions, to
explain the rejection of alternatives, and to show connections
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look doctrine originated in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,219
and was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,220 and incorporated into NEPA analysis
between statutory purposes and regulatory policies. The hardlook doctrine sometimes entails a close look at the ultimate
outcome as well.
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supranote 50, at 469-70 (citing
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983))
(footnote omitted). Consider former D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Harold
Leventhal's thoughts about "hard look" review:
There is no doubt that the scope ofjudicial review on the merits
is a narrow one, which must repose full latitude in the agency,
provided it has shown that it has taken a "hard look" at the
problems. It is not likely to be of great consequence whether the
formula is put in terms like the need for "substantial evidence"
or a "substantial inquiry" into whether the order was so lacking
in a reasoned basis as to be "arbitrary." . . . In any event, the
court will not be confined to bare formalities but will probe the
entire record to identify the choices made by the agency, to
determine whether there has been a disregard of ascertainable
legislative intent, to assure itself that the parties were offered
a reasonable opportunity to present their position, and to find
whether there has been a reasonable assessment of the
interrelated policy and legal questions.
Harold Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmakingand the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 540-41 (1974) (footnote omitted); see also Sunstein,
InterestGroups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 61-64 (discussing the
impact of the hard-look doctrines on notice-and-comment rulemaking and ex
parte contacts in rulemaking).
219 See Merrill, supra note 205, at 1093-94; Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, supra note 50, at 61 n.138.
220

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for
its action including a "rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made." In reviewing that explanation, we
must "consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
a clear error of judgment." Normally, an agency rule would be
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by legislative provision and judicial decision. 221 The hard look
doctrine's application of the arbitrary and capricious standard may
be understood as a constitutional mechanism designed to ensure
agencies do not exceed or abuse their political or legal authority.222
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make
up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for
the agency's action that the agency itself has not given.
Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
221 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989);
Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
The statutory requirement that a federal agency contemplating
a major action prepare such an environmental impact statement
serves NEPA's "action-forcing" purpose in two important
respects. It ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will
have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information
concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees
that the relevant information will be made available to the
larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.... The
sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus
realized through a set of"action-forcing" procedures that require
that agencies take a "hard look" at environmental consequences,
Kleppe, 427 U.S., at 410, [sic] n. 21, and that they provide for
broad dissemination of relevant environmental information.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 347-50 (citations
omitted). "The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard
look' at environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area
of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.'" Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton,
458
F.2d 827, 838, 148 U.S. App. D.C. 5, 16 (1972)).
222
See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, supra note 50, at 65.
The statutory prohibition set out in the APA applies to decisions
that are "arbitrary and capricious," but that standard is by no
means self-defining. Certainly the standard suggests that some
decisions may be unlawful although they are not prohibited by
statute: the APA calls for a reasonably aggressive judicial role
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In the context of applying the standard, "the principal justification
for judicial scrutiny is a fear of agency subversion of statutory
purposes."223
State Farm provides an example of the Reagan Administration's attempt to justify deregulation and to subvert statutory
purposes, actions that favored private industry. State Farm arose
when an administrator with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA") reinterpreted the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Act.224 The Court considered whether the NHTSA
administrator "acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the
requirement in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that new motor
vehicles produced after September 1982 be equipped with passive
restraints to protect the safety of the occupants of the vehicle in
the event of a collision."225
In 1978, Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams "issued
a new mandatory passive restraint regulation, known as Modified
Standard 208,"which provided automobile manufacturers with the
option of either installing airbags or passive seatbelts.226 The
Modified standard withstood judicial review 227 and congressional
scrutiny; Congress "did not exercise its authority under the
legislative veto provision of the 1974 Amendments."228 In 1981,
President Reagan's new Secretary of Transportation interrupted
the phasing in of passive restraints by rescinding the Modified
for review of discretion even where the governing statute is
silent. A central purpose of the standard is to ensure that
agency decisions are not simply bows in the direction of
powerful private groups. This general instruction in the APA
provides a "background rule" against which any legislative
"deal" must be read.
Cass R. Sunstein, Factions,Self-Interest, and the APA: FourLessons Since 1946,
72 VA. L. REV. 271, 284 (1986) (citations omitted).
223 Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 470.
224 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 36-37.
225

Id. at 34.

Id. at 37 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (July 5, 1977) and 49 C.F.R § 571.208
(1978)).
227 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 37.
228 Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
226
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Standard requirement.229 NHTSA's rescission was foreshadowed by
Secretary Andrew Lewis' decision to re-open the rulemaking
process "due to changed economic circumstances and, in particular,
the difficulties of the automobile industry."23 ° NHTSA contended
that contrary to the agency's 1977 conclusion, the Modified
Standard would produce "minimal safety benefits," saddle
manufacturers with unreasonable costs, and "might have an
adverse effect on the public's attitude toward safety."2 3 '
The State Farm Court's endorsement of the hard-look
doctrine included a thorough analysis of agency arguments
favoring an expansive interpretation of administrative power.2 3 2
The Court carefully compared the record with agency claims and
conclusions to determine whether the agency's explanation was
sufficient "to conclude that the rescission was the product of
reasoned decisionmaking."233 The Court's detailed analysis
provides important background principles for understanding the
legitimate application of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
The Court rejected several NHTSA arguments designed to
capitalize on institutions supporting agency discretion and
expertise by enhancing the agency's legal authority over
rulemaking and policy decisions.234

22 9

Id. at 38.

230Id.
231

Id.

at 38 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033 (Feb. 12, 1981)).
at 39. In a priceless illustration of self-serving arguments twisted to

benefit the American people, the Agency claimed that its decision was justified
by the desire to improve American attitudes toward safety regulation. "Given

the high expense and limited benefits of detachable belts, NHTSA feared that
many consumers would regard the Standard as an instance of ineffective
regulation, adversely affecting the public's view of safety regulation and, in
particular, 'poisoning. . popular sentiment toward efforts to improve occupant
restraint systems in the future.'" Id. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, at 53,424 (Oct.

29, 1981)).
232 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 36-37.
233

Id. at 52. "To reach this conclusion, we do not upset the agency's view of the

facts, but we do appreciate the limitations of this record in supporting the
agency's decision." Id.
234 See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
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First, the Court dismissed the agency argument that
constitutional presumptions afforded congressional legislation
under the Due Process Clause should govern judicial review of
agency regulations.235 Second, the Court denounced agency claims
that rescission was justified because different legal standards
should apply to deregulation and rulemaking decisions caused by
agencies' need to adapt to changing circumstances.236 Third, the
Court noted the agency's misguided efforts to claim that Vermont
Yankee NuclearPowerCorp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc.,2 7 was a "talisman under which any agency decision is by
definition unimpeachable."2 8 Finally, the Court rejected NHTSA
arguments relying upon agency "expertise"239 or "substantial
uncertainty"24 ° to support its decisions. In each instance, the Court
reiterated the need for vigorous judicial review of agency reasoning
processes.24 ' The Court's reasoning, taken as a whole, illustrates

235

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 44. "We do not view as equivalent the presumption

of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption
of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate." Id. at 43 n.9.
236

See id. at 41-44.

[Tihe forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the
direction of deregulation. In the abstract, there is no more
reason to presume that changing circumstances require the
rescission of prior action, instead of a revision in or even the
extension of current regulation. If Congress established a
presumption from which judicial review should start, that
presumption-contrary to petitioners' views-is not against
safety regulation, but againstchanges in current policy that are
not justified by the rulemaking record.
Id. at 42.
237

435 U.S. 519 (1978).

238

State Farm,463 U.S. at 50. "Petitioners both misread Vermont Yankee and

misconstrue the nature of the remand that is in order. In Vermont Yankee, we
held that a court may not impose additional procedural requirements upon an
agency."
Id.
239
Id. at 48.
240
Id.at 51.
241 See, e.g., id. at 53-56. The Court declined to give the NHTSA the authority
sought to re-write rules, i.e., laws, governing matters within the Agency's
expertise. Id. at 46-49. Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative
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its willingness to defend legislation advancing collective social
values against powerful business factions attempting to control
agency decisions. 242
process, but "unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict
and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a
monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion." Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (citing New York v. United
States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (dissenting opinion)). Similarly, agencies cannot
dictate the outcome of judicial decisions by reciting the phrase "substantial
uncertainty" and pleading agency discretion.
Petitioners [argue] . . . "substantial uncertainty" that a regulation will accomplish its intended purpose is sufficient reason,
without more, to rescind a regulation. We agree with petitioners
that just as an agency reasonably may decline to issue a safety
standard if it is uncertain about its efficacy, an agency may also
revoke a standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if
supported by the record and reasonably explained..
Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must
account for uncertainty, however, does not imply that it is
sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms "substantial
uncertainty" as a justification for its actions. As previously
noted, the agency must explain the evidence which is available,
and must offer a "rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made."
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51-52.
242 See Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50 at 471.
The majority's approach... should be seen.., as an effort to
"flush out" illegitimate or unarticulated factors-perhaps
solicitude for an ailing automobile industry or a general
antiregulatory animus-and to ensure that those factors are
available for discussion and comment during and after the
rulemaking process. In this respect, the hard-look doctrine
might be regarded as a means of limiting impermissible
influences in the regulatory process.
Id.
The automobile industry has opted for the passive belt over the
airbag, but surely it is not enough that the regulated industry
has eschewed a given safety device. For nearly a decade, the
automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war
against the airbag and lost-the inflatable restraint was proved
sufficiently effective. Now the automobile industry has decided
to employ a seatbelt system which will not meet the safety
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Since the early 1980s, the hard look doctrine has "withered
on the vine," 243 allowing the executive and its administrative
agencies to re-establish their power over environmental law and
policy. The shift in institutional power was prompted by political
and economic developments similar to those giving rise to the New
Deal. The United States faced economic recession and high
inflation aggravated by an energy crisis, military engagements in
the Middle East characterized by cultural and religious conflict,
and increased economic competitiveness overseas.2 " President
Reagan's policies favored powerful economic interests while
eroding social and environmental protections. The primary
political reactions to economic struggles were deregulation and
increased reliance upon private markets and private enterprise to
promote economic productivity.245
D.

Conclusion

The New Deal vision of successful government administered
by technical experts was prompted by a different worldview than
many professionals hold today; the conceptual divisions between
"science" and "values," and "political" and "administrative,"246 were

objectives of Standard 208. This hardly constitutes cause to
revoke the Standard itself. Indeed, the Act was necessary
because the industry was not sufficiently responsive to safety
concerns. The Act intended that safety standards not depend on
current technology and could be "technology-forcing" in the
sense of inducing the development of superior safety design.
State Farm,463 U.S. at 49.
243 Merrill, supra note 205, at 1095. Merrill argues that as the "capture theory
era" was replaced by public choice theory's conception of government, courts
retreated into "an apolitical, lawfinding function," but "[tihere is no logical
reason" for the shift to judicial review "turn[ing] on statutory interpretation, not
an examination of agency procedures or reason-giving." Id.
244 SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 30-31.
245 Id. at 31.
24 6Lessig & Sunstein, The President
and the Administration,supra note 137, at
99 (arguing that the post-New Deal view questions the very presupposition of
this nineteenth century model; the presupposition that the political can be so
sharply separated from the administrative).
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much sharper fifty years ago. The "expert" model was justified
as a sophisticated, "apolitical" 247 management technique that
assumed an agency's legislative goal could be realized through the
application of knowledge acquired from specialized experience;
i.e., "expertise."2" The New Deal's rapid and extensive creation of
agencies "breached" 249 the constitutional safeguards of electoral
Over time, Congress
accountability and separation of powers.
quietly fostered the growth of agency authority,2"' often resulting in
greater control over public policy by private interests exerting their
influence on agency lawmakers 25 2 working for the Executive Branch.
247
241

Stewart, supra note 136, at 1678 n.36.
Id. at 1678. Agency discretion was considered to be "bound by an ascer-

tainable goal, the state of the world, and an applicable technique." Id. at 1684.
There may be a trial and error process in finding the best means
of achieving the posited goal, but persons subject to the
administrator's control are no more liable to his arbitrary will
than are patients remitted to the care of a skilled doctor. This
analysis underlay the notion that administrators were not
political, but professional, and that public administration has an
objective basis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
249 Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 60.
2 50
Id. at 60. "That executive and administrative power developed so relatively
late and at so hard a pace has unsettled separation-of-powers values in the late
twentieth century." HURST, supra note 208, at 147.
251 Congressional exposure to a range of "diverse interests fostered inertia" more
often than legislation calculated to advance the public good. HURST, supra
note 208, at 147. "Especially the lateness and speed of executive-administrative
growth help to explain, though they do not justify, the extent to which the
legislative branch gave ground by default." Id.
252 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens &
Souter, JJ., concurring).
The Court has two choices. We could choose to articulate our
ultimate disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that
the power delegated to the EPA is "legislative" but nevertheless
conclude that the delegation is constitutional because
adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing statute.
Alternatively, we could pretend, as the Court does, that the
authority delegated to the EPA is somehow not "legislative
power." Despite the fact that there is language in our opinions
that supports the Court's articulation of our holding, I am
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"The constitutional status of administrative agencies has been
uncertain precisely because they evade the ordinary constitutional
safeguards against domination by powerful private groups."253
Environmental legislation institutionalized collective values
sacrificed by an inadequate regulatory system rooted in agencies'
expertise and discretion. Notwithstanding the successful efforts to
institutionally restructure agency authority during the 1960s and
1970s, the reach and significance of agencies' discretionary power
has expanded considerably; the legislative power feared by
Madison is now highly concentrated in administrative agencies
controlled by the Executive. 2 4 Administrators are well-insulated
and function with a notable absence of the Madisonian institutions
designed to minimize corrupt influences on Congress's legislative
decisions. Madison's work indirectly anticipated that administrative authority would serve as a conduit for the Executive's
persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what
we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency
rulemaking authority is "legislative power."
Id. (citations omitted).
253 Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 66.
254 Lessig & Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, supra note 137,
at 95 (1994) ("Lawmaking and law-interpreting authority is now concentrated
in an extraordinary array of regulatory agencies."); see also HURST, supra note
208, at 271.
In the twentieth century, the most significant competition for
policy-making position went on between legislatures and
executive and administrative officers. The legislative branch
continued to hold a great potential of authority, especially by its
right to control the public purse and its powers of investigation.
But, partly because of the complexity of the service and
regulatory demands that the growth of the society made on
government and partly because of defaults of leadership,
legislators have delegated more and more discretion to executive
and administrative officers, without keeping firm checks on
their delegates. After some seventy-five years of this course, the
prime issue over the character of government power is whether
the legislature can muster the will, courage, and skill to use its
potential capacity to call executive and administrative authority
to account.
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legislative, majoritarian impulses. The seeds for corruption in
environmental law and policy were planted by the New Deal's
uprooting of the Constitution's checks and balances.
IV.

AGENCY RULEMAKING: A CORRUPT OUTLET FOR EXECUTIVE
LEGISLATION

The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a
day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions
that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of
2 55
authority.
-Justice Felix Frankfurter
Administrative agencies are plagued by constitutional
problems of accountability and deliberation.256 Constitutional
principles continue to deteriorate through the corrupt exercise of
agencies' discretion in the promulgation and implementation of
rules interpreting congressional legislation.257 Unchecked agency
power constitutes the greatest threat to collective value protections
255

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
supra note 18, at 101.

256 SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION,
25 7

Id.

A principal goal of the New Deal period was to ensure that
regulatory policy would be made through a democratic process
that would reflect the public will. But in the implementation
process these aspirations are often defeated. Systems devised to
promote democratic goals can be undermined by factional power
or administrative self-interest. The result is a perversion of the
democratic aspirations of regulatory reformers-perhaps the
principal complaint of post-New Deal administrative law.
Id. (footnote omitted). Environmental legislations' procedural strictures are
generally insufficient to ensure the roots of agency decisions are grounded in
reasonable consideration of ecological principles and social well-being, and not
illegitimately influenced by private industry. "The prognosis that procedural
requirements may be largely ineffective in controlling agency tendencies to favor
organized interests where the record does not focus decision, and where the
weighting of key variables is left unresolved, is confirmed. . . by experience
under the National Environmental Policy Act." Stewart, supranote 136, at 1780.
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in environmental law. 258 Environmental regulatory agencies'
discretionary authority, coupled with the expansion of Executive
power over the past half-century, subverts the constitutional
protections against corruption of public policy. Socio-ecological
objectives spanning across generations require institutional
restructuring to help reverse America's trend toward oligarchy.
Examples from the EPA and the FWS illustrate corrupt
practices at work within environmental quality and public land
management agencies.2 59 Congress instructed the office of the

258

See Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, supra note 50, at 452.
This decline in faith in the institutional program of the New
Deal is entirely justified. The New Deal attack on checks and
balances was not a necessary part of its institutional framework
and was largely a mistake. An aggressive role for each of the
constitutionally specified branches-even a form of checks and
balances-can promote those substantive goals of the New Deal
that have a claim to contemporary support. The current task is
to devise institutional structures and arrangements that will
accomplish some of the original constitutional purposes in an
administrative era; this is no small ambition in light of the
continuing rejection of the traditional notion of "limited
government" with which the original distribution of powers was
closely allied.

Id.

This Article focuses on two rulemaking decisions, but they are certainly not
the only examples available. Administrative agency rulemaking and rule
implementation is too often characterized by highly suspect rationalizations
ultimately favoring private industry. Agency decisions may fail to provide any
explanation for a particular decision. See, e.g., Vigil v. EPA, 381 F.3d 826, 844-45
(9th Cir. 2004) ("In short, EPA's approval of the rejection of CARB diesel under
the BACM standard referred to a nonexistent justification and was therefore
arbitrary and capricious."). Agencies may ignore their own scientists' claims.
See, e.g., Idaho Sporting Cong., v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 972 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that "the Forest Service's own scientific evidence invalidates the use of
the proxy-on-proxy approach," and "the record demonstrates that the Forest
Service's methodology for dedicating old growth is so inaccurate that it turns out
there is no old growth at all in management area 35, where the Forest Service
has purported to dedicate 1,280 acres of old growth"). Agencies fail to perform
cumulative analysis. See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. BLM, 387
F.3d 989, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding "analyses performed by the BLM do not
259
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sufficiently consider the cumulative impacts posed by the timber sales").
Agencies erroneously delay regulatory action. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild Swan
v. EPA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Mont. 1999) ("[At] its current pace, the [State
of Montana] will need over one hundred years to develop the 3000 TMDLs [total
maximum daily loads] required for the WQLSs [water quality limited segments]
identified in 1998. The net result will be to put off for another generation a
mandate that Congress required be taken years ago . . . the EPA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to disapprove of Montana's inadequate submission of TMDLs."). Agencies claim regulatory justifications that
challenge credulity. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2003).
In spite of EPA's claims that air pollution in California's Imperial Valley
originated in Mexico, "there simply is no possibility that Mexican transport could
have caused the observed PM-10 exceedences." Id. "EPA's notion of what
constitutes a southerly wind in the windroses is... at the least, expansive and
S.. positively incorrect. Second, the 'southerly component' EPA professes to
locate in the wind data would appear to be inconsistent with its theory ... the
wind data does not support the theory of transport from Mexico." Id. at 962-63.
Finally, agencies create new legal standards contravening Congress's express
statutory enactments. See, e.g., Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that FWS changed an ESA
legal standard by altering the definition of "adverse modification").
[T]he regulatory definition of "adverse modification" contradicts
Congress's express command. As the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
have already recognized, the regulatory definition reads the
"recovery" goal out of the adverse modification inquiry; a
proposed action "adversely modifies" critical habitat if, and only
if, the value of the critical habitat for survival is appreciably
diminished.... This cannot be right.
Id. (citations omitted). Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 498-506 (2d
Cir. 2005) (finding that EPA arbitrarily and capriciously violated the express
terms of the CAA by altering the regulatory relationship between National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System authorities and the regulated group
consisting of "concentrated animal feeding operations"); see also infra Part B.
The exercise of agency authority during the rulemaking and rule implementation processes should raise concerns about the real justification for the
agency's decisions. Moreover, court case results are generally a poor indicator

of the extent of a social problem. See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
supra note 18 at 101-02 ("The problems.., include the secrecy of the process,
the power of parochial interests, and the absence of accountability to the
public."). Agencies serve the public, yet obscure or irrational justifications for
their decisions illustrate a cultural tendency to preserve authority by revealing
as little as possible about their decision-making processes. This administrative
approach to government not only abuses the public trust, but also sacrifices the
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Inspector General ("OIG") for the EPA and the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") to conduct an investigation of the EPA
rulemaking process leading to the May 18, 2005 Clean Air Mercury
Rule ("CAM1R"). 260 The investigation yielded records providing a rare
and important look inside the EPA.26 ' The Canada Lynx saga lasted
almost a decade before the FWS was, in effect, ordered by a U.S.
District Court to follow the FWS scientists' recommendation
to list
262
the Lynx as threatened or endangered under the ESA.
The EPA and FWS histories show how corruption may
disrupt the institutions providing for just implementation of environmental legislation. 263 Agency discretion allows the Executive
to pursue backdoor legislation with few, if any, potential consequences for agency employees 2 or political appointees deviating
interests of most agency employees who are dedicated to advancing environmental legislations' collective values.
260 2005 Clean Air Mercury Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75).
261

See

UNITED STATES EPA, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,

P-00003,

REP. No. 2005-

ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF MERCURY EMISSIONS NEEDED BEFORE

FINALIZES RULES FOR COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2005),

EPA

available at

http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050203-2005-P-00003.pdf
[hereinafter
OIG EVALUATION REP.]; U.S. GOVERNMENTACCOUNTABiLITYOFFICE, REP. No. 05252, OBSERVATIONS ON EPA's COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ITS MERCURY CONTROL
OPTIONS, (2005) available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-252
[hereinafter OBSERVATIONS].
262 See ESA, supra note 11; see also infra Part III.B.
263 This Article does not claim to cover all instances of corruption-the available
information is far from complete. The abuse of agency authority adversely
impacting environmental law and regulation warrants a comprehensive,
congressionally-mandated investigation.
264 The following point warrants repetition-most agency employees are
honorable individuals who were drawn to work with environmental quality or
land management agencies by the statutory purposes defining an agency's
mission. Many of these career-minded, federal civil servants are placed in
undesirable positions by political appointees seeking to change rather than
implement statutory provisions governing agency decisions. The political and
legal rollercoaster caused by corrupt influences at the top (in the agency or at
the Department level) should not be associated with agency workers who are
often disheartened (or worse) by corrupt practices undermining environmental
legislation's collective, socio-ecological values.
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from statutory responsibilities or accepted agency practices.
Administrators seek to optimize their lawmaking authority by
framing the justification for final rule decisions in terms of their
discretionary exercise of expertise.265 Administrators also tend
to exploit scientific uncertainty to suit their political agendas,
rather than resolve issues of uncertainty by engaging the broader
scientific community in a constitutionally and epistemologically
sound deliberative process.266 Finally, administrators control the
information and the knowledge bearing upon reasonable intraagency and public review of rule proposals. Agencies unilaterally
decide whether relevant information becomes part of the public
record as well as the context for public review.
A.

EPA's Mercury Emissions Rule-Executive Legislation

On March 15, 2005, the EPA issued the final CAMR.267 The
rule regulates mercury emissions from coal-fired steam generating
utility units through a national cap-and-trade program implemented under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. The agency
proposed an interim 2010 cap based on the maximum amount of
mercury reductions that could be achieved with technological
controls reducing sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions; i.e.,
the mercury co-benefit achievable through implementation of the
Clean Air Interstate Rule ("CAIR). 268 The first phase cap of 38
265

See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-49; see also supra notes 234-36 and

accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 53-56. See generally Jeffrey Rudd, The
ForestService's Epistemic Judgments, 23 TEMP. ENV. L. & TECH. J. 145, 185-211

(2004) (arguing that the Forest Service's 'best available science' regulation
requires the agency to engage the broader scientific community when resolving
issues of scientific uncertainty).
267 2005 Clean Air Mercury Rule, supranote 260. This Article does not assess the
legal implications and/or shortcomings of the final rule except to the extent that
agency decisions corrupted the rulemaking process. The OIG and GAO reports
reveal a number of concerns that will likely (as they should) support arguments
that the CAMR is the product of EPA's "arbitrary and capricious" rulemaking
procedures.
268

Id.
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tons per year becomes effective in 2010, and a second phase cap of
15 tons per year becomes effective in 2018.269
The administrative process that culminated with the final
rule's publication presents an unusual opportunity to examine the
constitutional problems presented by administrators' subservience
to the lawmaking desires of the executive branch. Senators from
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee directed the
EPA's OIG to review the "process used to develop the [EPA's]
January 2004 proposed rule for regulating mercury emissions from
coal-fired, steam generating electric utility units."27 ° The OIG
report reveals significant legal and political issues surrounding the
Rule's preparation and publication. EPA senior staff rigidly
controlled the analysis performed pursuant to the CAA 1 inhibiting intra-agency and public deliberation and limiting dissent in
order to attain the desired political goal: backdoor enactment of the
Clear Skies legislation that had failed to pass congressional
inspection and analysis. 2 " EPA actively skirted the institutional
framework designed to ensure that administrative regulations

26 9

id.

270

OIG EVALUATION

REP.,

supra note 261, at 1. "OIG conducted interviews of

staff for EPA offices and outside organizations to gain an understanding of the
rule as it developed, other options considered, and the rule development
process." Id. at 6. They also "reviewed data and analysis developed in support
of the rule... [and] related information provided by both EPA and non-EPA
officials." Id. at 8-9. OIG requested, but did not receive, "several important
documents" from the agency. Id. at 9.
271

Id. at 13-16.
Id.

at 15 ("EPA has stated its intent to implement its multi-pollutant
(mercury, [sulfur dioxide], and [nitrous oxide]) cap-and-trade programs,
originally included in stalled Clear Skies legislation, through the proposed CAIR
and mercury regulations.").
When the Clear Skies legislation stalled, EPA decided to address
the Clear Skies program in a regulatory manner instead. This
led to EPA including a mercury cap-and-trade option, similar to
Clear Skies, in its proposed mercury rule. As focus on the capand-trade approach increased, EPA began to de-emphasize the
mercury MACT [maximum achievable control technology]
development process.
OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 27.
272

444

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.

[Vol. 30:371

reasonably implement legislation and result from public
deliberation about relevant issues. Simply put, the OIG investigation reveals a pattern of corrupt practices designed to enact
Executive legislation.
The EPA's mercury emissions rulemaking process lacked
scientific integrity and institutional legitimacy. "EPA senior
management instructed [agency] staff to develop a MACT [maximum achievable control technology] standard for mercury that
would result in national emissions of 34 tons annually,"273 which
violated the CAA requirement to base the MACT standard "on the
emissions levels achieved by the top performing 12 percent of
units, not a targeted national emissions result."274 EPA conducted
"at least three Integrated Planning Model (IPM) runs"275 before
producing a technical analysis that supported its preferred
standard.276 On its first two runs, the integrated model produced
floor standards of twenty-nine and twenty-seven tons per year;
EPA excluded these analyses from the proposed and final rule.277
"An Agency source indicated that these results were not acceptable
to senior management because they were not close enough to the
34-tons target."278 According to an EPA official, an unbiased analysis
would have produced a range between "about 15 tons per year to the
low 20s for this MACT, and that anything above or below those
numbers was a stretch."279 EPA withheld the alternative scientific

Id. at 11.
Id. "The 34-tons-per-year target was based on the co-benefits expected to be
achieved from implementation of NOx and SO 2 controls under the proposed
CAIR." Id. The EPA engaged in a similar practice when implementing the
Clean Water Act. See Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 385 F.3d 969, 981-82 (6th
Cir. 2004).
275 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,619 ("IPM is a multi-regional, dynamic, deterministic
linear programming model of the U.S. electric power sector.").
276 OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 13.
277 Id. at 14. The "third run... showed 31 tons. EPA cited the 31-tons model
273

274

results in the proposed rule, but explained in the preamble that 34 tons is the
more probable emissions level because the model used to estimate emissions was
underestimating the amount of mercury emissions that would occur." Id.

278

Id.

OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 15. "This includes the 34 tons
proposed by the Agency. These statements about the possible range of MACT
279
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analyses from the public domain in order to preserve the predetermined, thirty-four tons per year MACT target.2 "'
EPA's corrupt MACT analysis was consistent with other
agency decisions bypassing scientific-technical analyses likely to
generate dissent. EPA failed to comply with its year 2000 finding
that trading programs must ensure the health and safety of communities located near an emissions source.28 ' OIG determined that
EPA failed to reasonably analyze the risks to local populations
of "hot spots" caused by the cap-and-trade alternative 28 2 and to

floors are supported by results of different MACT floor limits and/or varying
model assumptions used by some organizations providing comments to the
proposed rule." Id. at 15-16.
280 OIG concluded that "EPA's approach for developing the MACT floor was
compromised." Id. at 16.
We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for Air and
Radiation: J2-1 Conduct an unbiased analysis of the mercury
emissions data to establish a MACT floor in accordance with the
requirements of CAA section 112(d). 2-2 Re-negotiate with the
court petitioner for an extension of the final rulemaking
deadline sufficient to solicit and accept public comments on the
unbiased analysis of mercury emissions data in an open, public,
and transparent manner.
Id. The CAMR's final MACT floor is thirty-eight tons per year, rather than the
lower, biased standard of thirty-four tons per year. The Final Rule ignores OIG's
concerns about the legitimacy of the rulemaking process.
281 See OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 6.
[I]n its December 2000 notice, EPA cited concerns about the
potential local impact of emissions trading and noted that any
trading program must be constructed in a way that assured
communities nearest a source were adequately protected. The
Notice stated:
Thus, in developing a standardfor utilities, the
EPA should consider the legalpotentialfor, and
the economic effects of, incorporatinga trading
regime under section 112 in a manner that
protects the local populations.
Id.
282 Id. at 20 ("EPA did not fully analyze the potential for hot spots (i.e., areas
of elevated pollutant concentrations) to occur under its proposed cap-andtrade option.").
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"adequately evaluate the 28environmental
health effects of the
3
proposed rule on children."
EPA's scientific methodology developed within a contrived
institutional framework that limited potential challenges to the
Executive's legislative objectives. OIG's investigation reveals EPA
"senior management "2 " or "higher level"285 authorities dictated
significant deviation from past rule development practices, precluding reasonable intra-agency and public participation in the
rulemaking process.28 EPA's circumvention of the "normal intraagency review process"287 reduced the risk that internal agency
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32 ("EPA staff told OIG that senior management instructed them not
to undertake certain scientific and technical analyses that they thought
necessary."); see also id. at 11, 14.
2815OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 31.
Several EPA staff who were involved in the abbreviated intraagency work group review process told the OIG that it was made
clear to them by their managers, and in the case of one work
group representative, by the work group chair, that decisions
about this rule were being made at a "higher level." For
example, in an e-mail discussing intra-agency comments, a
member of the work group was told:
The decision was made at a much higher level
than mine to "bypass" the normal EPA Work
Group procedure prior to the proposal and we
have been told that all the Office directors were
contacted about both the process change and
rulemaking.
Id.
286 For example, EPA unexpectedly terminated communication with Federal
Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") members, failing to honor its commitment to
provide the group with "additional analyses using the IPM to further explore the
cost-benefit of different MACT proposals as presented by the working group
members." Id. at 29. Congressman Waxman subsequently contacted EPA about
the status of the working group's request for additional IPM runs. In July 2003,
EPA Administrator Christine Whitman "stated that it was the Agency's
intention to convene an additional FACA meeting when the IPM analyses were
complete."Id. An EPA Assistant Administrator later advised, however, that "the
Agency would not provide the additional MACT IPM analyses and would instead
focus resources on developing a cap-and-trade alternative, the administration's
preferred regulatory approach." Id.
287 OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 27.
283

284
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views might oppose the administration's preference."' Established
internal rulemaking practices 2ss were abandoned, constraining
the intra-agency working group's ability to participate in the
rulemaking process. s° Senior management limited the group to
two meetings and deterred "meaningful feedback on the proposed
rule."2 9 ' The group was directed to review and comment on a draft
analytical blueprint for the rulemaking 22 and an "early version of

288
289

Id. at 16.
The agency's accepted procedures are described in its EPA's Action

Development Process: Guidance for EPA Staff on Developing Quality Actions.
OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 27 [hereinafter Action Development
Process]. The Action Development Process "outlines steps EPA staff and
management are to follow when developing Agency actions, such as rules, policy
statements, and statutorily mandated reports to Congress." Id.
The Action Development Process guidance contains five key
elements, which are summarized below. These include steps for:
*
planning sound scientific and economic analysis;
*
developing and selecting regulatory options based on
relevant scientific, economic, and policy analyses;
*
involving affected Headquarters and Regional managers
early and continuing involvement until the final action
is completed;
*
ensuring active and appropriate
cross-Agency
participation; and
*
encouraging appropriate and meaningful consultation
with stakeholders through substantive consultative
procedures.
Id. at 27-28. For additional details of the rule development process applicable for
the CAMR, see id. at 44-45 app. D.
290 OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 30.
291 Id.
292 OIG EVALUATION REP., supra note 261, at 30. "According to EPA's Action
Development Plan, an analytical blueprint is 'a document that spells out a work
group's plans for data collection and analyses that will support development of
a specific action,' and is intended to be developed as 'a collaborative effort.'" Id.
The draft blueprint listed the rulemaking's minimum analytical requirements.
The draft blueprint stated, "the intent of the rule is to require
that oil-and-coal-fired units achieve a MACT-level of control,"
and it listed the "minimum analytical needs" for the rulemaking:
*
A regulatory impact analysis, assessing the economic
impact on industry of levels beyond the MACT floor.
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the draft (July 3, 2003) preamble."293 In a noteworthy deviation
from past practices, the working group did not receive "feedback or
modified drafts of any work products based on their comments and
input,"294 nor was the group given "the opportunity to concur or
nonconcur with the proposed rule."295 The intra-agency review
process was less collaborative, substantive, and inclusive than in
the past, thus effectively insulating the administration's preference
from challenge.
The GAO report also highlights the Executive's ability to
withhold information, control analysis, and curtail opposition
through the institutional structure enhancing agency authority
relative to other stakeholders, including non-upper level employees. GAO "identified four major shortcomings" in the economic
analysis EPA relied upon to compare the MACT and cap-and-trade
alternatives to justify CAMR. 296 First, EPA did not provide
*
*
0
*
*

*
Id.
at
30-31.
293
Id. at 31.

Assessment of multi-pathway concerns.
A regulatory flexibility analysis addressing small
business concerns.
Assessment of environmental justice concerns.
Children's health concerns.
Unfunded mandate assessment, evaluating the impact
of the rulemaking on State/local/tribal governments,
some of which own or operate coal-fired units.
ICR issues.

294 Id.

295

OIG EVALUATION REP., supranote 261, at 31. From a substantive perspective,

EPA failed to adequately satisfy the draft blueprint's "minimum analytical"
requisites pertaining to children's health, "tribal concerns," and cost-benefit
analyses. Id. at 24, 30-34. See generally OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261.
296 OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261, at 8. First, EPA did not consistently analyze
each of its two mercury policy options or provide estimates of the total costs and
benefits of the two options, making it difficult to ascertain which policy option
would provide the greatest net benefits. Id. "EPA's estimates of the costs and
benefits of its two proposed policy options are not comparable because the
agency used inconsistent approaches in analyzing the two options." Id. at 8; see
id. at 8-10. Second, EPA did not document some of its analysis or provide
consistent information on the anticipated economic effects of different mercury
control levels under the two options. Id. at 8; see id. at 10-12. Third, [EPA] the
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estimates of total costs and benefits associated with the MACT and
cap-and-trade options.297 Second, economic analysis of the two
options' effects under different mercury control levels was incomplete and inconsistent.298 Third, EPA "did not estimate the
economic benefits directly related to decreased mercury
emissions. " 29 Finally, the agency failed to analyze and describe
"key uncertainties underlying its cost-and-benefit estimates." °°
The defects in EPA's analysis "limit its usefulness for informing
decision makers and the public about the economic trade-offs of the
two options." 0 1
EPA's rulemaking decisions contravene OMB guidance
under Executive Order 12,866,302 which "direct[s] agencies to
agency did not estimate the economic benefits directly related to decreased
mercury emissions. OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261, at 8; see id. at 12-13.
"Finally, [EPA] did not analyze some of the key uncertainties underlying its
cost-and-benefit estimates." Id. at 8; see id. at 13-15.
297 Id.
298 id.

299

OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261, at 8; see id. at 12-13.

Because the two options in the proposed rule differed
significantly in both the amount of mercury emission reductions
and the time frames in which these reductions would occur, the
lack of estimates of the mercury-specific benefits of each policy
option represents a significant limitation of EPA's economic
analysis. That is, to the extent that each proposed option would
yield measurable mercury-specific health benefits, EPA's
analysis may underestimate the total expected benefits of both
options. Moreover, because the options may yield different
mercury-related health benefits, the lack of estimates of these
benefits makes it difficult to weigh the relative merits of the two
proposed options.
Id.
at
12.
' 00Id. at 8; see id. at 13-15.
301 OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261, at 8.
302 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); see also
OBSERVATIONS, supra note

261, at 2.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has developed
guidance and best practices under Executive Order 12866 that,
among other things, direct agencies to explore alternative
regulatory approaches, taking into consideration different levels
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conduct their economic analysis in accordance with the principles
of full disclosure and transparency,"3 °3 and also "analyze and
present information on uncertainties with their cost-and-benefit
estimates."3 °4 EPA's economic analysis required information about
future electricity demand, fuel prices, industry cost, technology
development, and performance of emissions control technologies. °5
EPA's assumptions about future demand, price, cost, and performance parameters generated uncertainties affecting the costbenefit scenarios' reliability. 30 6 However, EPA did not disclose the
uncertainties produced by such assumptions, 30 7 pre-empting both

of stringency, and identify the policy that would maximize net
benefits (total benefits minus total costs), unless another
approach is required by statute. OMB guidance states that
identifying the policy option with the greatest net benefits is
useful information for decision makers and the public, even
when maximizing net benefits is not the only or overriding
policy objective. In addition, OMB guidance directs agencies to
conduct their economic analyses in accordance with the
principles of full disclosure and transparency. Furthermore, in
cases such as the final mercury rule, where expected economic
impacts would exceed $1 billion annually, OMB guidance
directs agencies to identify and quantitatively analyze key uncertainties in their economic analysis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
303 OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261, at 11, 13-14. EPA's failure to include in the
proposed MACT rule the IPM analysis producing more stringent mercury limits
"is inconsistent with EPA's analysis of the cap-and-trade option, in which it
provided a range of costs and benefits associated with different levels of
stringency." Id. at 11; see also supra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
'04 OBSERVATIONS, supra note 261, at 13.
30 5
Id. at 13.
306
Id. at 13-14.
307
Id. "EPA did not assess how the distribution of estimated benefits and costs
would differ given changes in its assumptions about the availability, cost, and
performance of mercury control technologies, even though the agency believes
that these assumptions could affect its economic modeling." Id. at 13. "Furthermore, EPA's economic analysis states that the benefits analysis has many
sources of uncertainty, including those associated with emissions data, air
quality modeling, and the effect of emissions on human health. The agency did
not, however, formally assess the impact of these uncertainties." Id. at 14.
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reliable, scientific analysis and the opportunity for the general
public (and EPA staff) to meaningfully evaluate the model's
conclusions. In scientific analyses, uncertainties and their implications warrant discussion, not simply authoritative resolution. 0 8
According to senior EPA officials responsible for
analyzing the mercury proposal, changes in these
assumptions could have a sizable impact on the
agency's cost-and-benefit estimates. This acknowledgment of key uncertainties in its economic modeling
highlights the need to determine how they could
affect the overall cost-and-benefit estimates for each
proposed option.0 9
The OIG and GAO reports show that EPA's corrupt
"scientific" analysis, information suppression and institutional
modifications were part of a broader regulatory strategy to control
deliberation and dissent affecting CAMR promulgation under the
CAA. The CAMR investigation reveals that the Executive overran
Congress to grant the status of law to a policy agenda appeasing
private industry. EPA's approach to the scientific analysis process
and its deviation from past rulemaking practices point to a fundamental institutional malady; the OIG and GAO reports provide a
Science is a discursive process and the scientific claims of legitimacy as
knowledge hinge on the opportunity for critical discourse in relevant scientific
communities. See HELEN E. LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: VALUES
308

AND OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

69 (1990).

What is called scientific knowledge, then, is produced by a
community (ultimately the community of all scientific practitioners) and transcends the contributions of any individual or
even of any subcommunity within the larger community. Once
propositions, theses, and hypotheses are developed, what will
become scientific knowledge is produced collectively through the
clashing and meshing of a variety of points of view.
Id.; see also Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the EndangeredSpecies
Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1061-

62 (1997).

309 OBSERVATIONS,

supra note 261, at 14.
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compelling argument for a full-scale congressional investigation of
EPA's rulemaking process. Agencies exercise their political and legal
authority to control the reasonable evaluation of proposed rules
by minimizing dissent3 1 ° or opposition to Executive preferenceagencies may redefine the institutions governing their constitutional and legislative responsibilities to achieve corrupt objectives.
Unfortunately, EPA shares the spotlight with other federal
agencies dominated by political appointees intent on functionally
superseding environmental legislation with either carefully crafted
rules or representing Executive fiat.
B.

Lynx I: The Illusion of Scientific Uncertainty

The Canada Lynx saga lasted over ten years and implicates
top officials at FWS as participants in the steady erosion of
environmental legislation's socio-ecological values. In the mid1990s, the Lynx I conflict developed between FWS and numerous
environmental organizations over listing the Canada Lynx as
endangered or threatened under the ESA.311 The conflict reignited
several years later inLynx H after FWS failed to comply with a
U.S. District Court decision requiring the agency to designate
critical habitat for the lynx.3 12 The Lynx I Court described the
admirable scientific investigation conducted by agency scientists
and FWS administrators' corrupt efforts to overcome the scientists'

310

For a discussion of the risks of conformist, majoritarian pressures and the role

of "dissent" in democracy, see generally CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 145-65 (2003). "Institutions are far more likely to succeed if they subject
leaders to critical scrutiny and if they ensure that courses of action will face
continuing monitoring and review from outsiders-if, in short, they use diversity
and dissent to reduce the risks of error that come from social influences." Id.
at 148.
311 Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1997) [hereinafter
Lynx I].
312 Defenders of Wildlife v.Norton, 239 F.Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C.2002) [hereinafter
Lynx II].
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conclusions. The administrators revised customary agency interpretations of the ESA,313 withheld FWS scientists' research and
conclusions from the public domain, 314 and deceptively applied a
non-agency scientist's report out-of-context in an attempt to
315
prevent listing the Lynx.

The ESA was designed to ensure "better safeguarding, for the benefit of all
citizens, the Nation's heritage in fish, wildlife and plants." 16 U.S.C § 153 1(a)(5)
(2000). Congress intended the ESA to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems
upon which endangered and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and]
to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species." Id. §
1531(a)(1)(B). The ESA requires FWS to evaluate five factors to determine
whether to list a species as "threatened" or "endangered:"
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) over-utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence.
Id. § 1533(a)(1). "[T]hreatened species" are species that are "likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." Id. § 1533(20). "[E]ndangered species" refers to any species
"which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range." Id. § 1533(6). The Secretary of the Interior (through the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service) determines whether species should be listed as
endangered or threatened "solely on the basis of the best available scientific and
commercial data." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000). FWS must respond within
ninety days after receiving an interested person's petition to add a species to the
list of endangered and threatened species. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(D)(i). If the agency
determines that the petition presents "substantial scientific or commercial
information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted," FWS must
review the species' status within twelve months of the agency's receipt of the
petition to determine whether listing is warranted. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(D)(i). FWS
decisions that petitions are without merit-referred to statutorily as "negative
findings"--are subject to judicial review. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3)(C)(ii) (2000). The
agency must publish its review of the species' status within twelve months from
the date FWS receives the petition. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(5) (2000).
314 Lynx I, 958 F. Supp. at 685; see also infra notes 326-40 and accompanying
text.
315 See infra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
313
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In mid-1994, the Biodiversity Legal Foundation ("BLF")
filed a petition with FWS requesting that the "conterminous
United States population of the 'North American' lynx... be listed
17
3 16
as a threatened or endangered species." FWS's 90-day finding
indicated that all five ESA criteria for listing a species as endangered were applicable to lynx and that listing "may be
warranted."318 The finding "emphasized that habitat destruction
316

90-Day Finding for a Petition to List as Endangered or Threatened the

Contiguous United States Population of the Canada lynx and to Emergency List
a Southern Rocky Mountain Population, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,123 (Aug. 26, 1994) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 90-Day Finding for a Petition]. The
Foundation argued that the following reasons justified listing the lynx:
1. Intensive logging that eliminates foraging and denning
habitat for Canada lynx and snowshoe hare.., creates openings
in the forest that Canada lynx avoid, and causes habitat
fragmentation that creates barriers to dispersal and
colonization; 2. Logging roads allow human accessibility that
may increase incidental trapping.. . and disrupt Canada lynx
travel and hunting; 3. Forest fire suppression adversely affects
Canada lynx through the reduction of hare habitat; 4. Few
comprehensive management plans for Canada lynx have been
developed or implemented by government agencies; 5. State
agencies have not adequately modified their furbearer
regulations; 6. The Canada lynx's inherent characteristics,
including naturally low population densities, specialized prey
requirements, and large home ranges, make it vulnerable to
extinction; and 7. The southern Rockies population is further
threatened by ski area developments that may reduce habitat
and prey base and increase human disturbance and accidental
trapping.
Id.
31 See 12-Month Finding for a Petition to List as Endangered or Threatened the
Contiguous United States Population of the Canada Lynx, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,507,
66,507-09 (Dec. 27, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 12Month Finding].
318 90-Day Finding for a Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. at 44,123-24. FWS's pertinent
"listing" conclusions included:
A. The Present or Threatened Destruction, Modification, or
Curtailmentof Its Habitat or Range
The suppression of forest fires and intensive logging
prescriptions have had a detrimental effect on Canada lynx
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and fragmentation, due particularly to heavy logging, threatened
the continued existence of the Lynx."319
The FWS Region Six Office32 ° assumed the principal duties
for researching the lynx's "biological status"321 and for drafting a
proposed 12-month listing decision in response to the Foundation's
petition.322 In October 1994, the Region Six biologists concluded
"that the Lynx should be listed throughout its range in the
conterminous United States."323 The FWS biologists' recommendation was supported by an extensive analysis of the Lynx's current
status;... no FWS biologist or lynx expert disagreed with the

habitat, and logging roads have increased human accessibility
to the species.
B. Overutilizationfor Commercial... Scientific or Educational
Purposes
Past overharvest has had a detrimental effect on Canada lynx
populations.
C. Disease or Predation
Canada lynx may be displaced or eliminated when competitors,
such as the bobcat or coyote, expand into the range of the
Canada lynx.
D. The Inadequacy of Existing Regulatory Mechanisms
[Many States] either prohibit or control the "take" of Canada
Lynx, but their laws are relative [ly] ineffective in controlling the
loss or modification of the species' habitat.
E. Other Natural or Manmade FactorsAffecting Its Continued
Existence
Human development has had a detrimental effect on the
Canada lynx habitat and population.
Id. (emphasis added).
319

Lynx I, 958 F. Supp. at 675.

. comprises a significant portion of the Lynx's historical range,
including Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming." Lynx I, 958
F. Supp. at 674.
321 Notice of Status Review for the Lynx, 59 Fed. Reg. 4887 (Feb.
2, 1994) (to be
codified
at
50
C.F.R.
pt.
17).
322
Id. at 676. Region Six biologists reviewed the public comments and additional
scientific information while also conducting their own review of "available
scientific and commercial information." Id.
323
Id. The potential listing affected FWS Regions 1, 3, 5, and 6.
320

"Region 6.

324 id.

.
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Region Six biologists' 50-page recommendation to list the lynx
under the ESA.325
The Acting Director of FWS, Richard Smith, however,
"rejected Region 6's proposal in a five-page memorandum which
summarily concluded that the 'listing of the Lynx in the 48
contiguous States is not warranted.'" 326 FWS justified its decision
not to list the lynx by claiming the Region Six biologists' report
"'did not provide any conclusive evidence of the biological vulnerability or real threats to the species in the contiguous 48 states.' 32 7
Smith's memorandum did not cite any scientific study, lynx
expert, or any other reliable source to support claims that directly

The [FWS Region 6] biologists drafted a [proposed 12-month
finding] to list one segment of the Lynx population, in the
Northwest and Northern Rockies, as threatened, and a second
population, in the Southern Rockies, Great Lakes, and
Northeast, as endangered. This recommendation was
accompanied by an extensive, 50-page analysis of the Lynx's
history and current status. The Region 6 biologists concluded
that "Canada lynx populations in the contiguous United States
have suffered significant declines due to trapping and hunting
and habitat loss".. . and that at least four of the five statutory
criteria for listing a species under the ESA apply to the
Lynx.... Relying on extensive citations of scientific evidence,
the biologists concluded that Lynx habitat is currently being
destroyed, degraded, and fragmented by a number of factors
including timber harvest, fire suppression, road construction,
and clearing of forests for urbanization, ski areas, and
agriculture.
Id. The Region Six biologists circulated their draft"12-month finding" for review
by FWS biologists in three other FWS regions containing lynx populations. Lynx
1,958 F. Supp. at 676. FWS scientists in the Great Lakes area (Region 3) and the
Northeast area (Region 5) supported the Region Six biologists' opinion. Id. The
Director of Region One, which encompasses the Pacific Northwest, was the only
director to oppose the Region Six biologists' scientific position. Id. However,
"[elven within Region 1, the FWS biologists in the agency's field office in
Washington State-the state with the largest Lynx population in Region
1-supported the proposed rule." Id.
325

Id.

326 Id.

327

Id. at 679.
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contradicted the Region Six biologists' conclusions.328 Acting
Director Smith stated that "'[t]here is little evidence that lynx
populations have suffered significant declines due to trapping and
hunting' and that 'hunting and trapping pressure on the lynx in
the U.S. has always been low."' 329 On December 27, 1994, FWS
published a 12-month finding consistent with Smith's five-page
memo that officially disagreed with petitioner's position and
concluded that the lynx should not be listed as threatened or
endangered.3 3 ° FWS's ruling did not disclose Region Six's scientific
data and conclusions, their draft proposal, or their 50-page
recommendation, and it contradicted each of the agency's conclusions in the 90-day finding.3 3' The agency's 12-month finding
suggested that (1) contiguous United States lynx populations were
never biologically viable, and (2) any fluctuations in lynx populations were due to "dispersal" events.332
32' Lynx I, 958 F. Supp. at 676.
329
330

Id. (citations omitted).
12-Month Finding, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,507, 66,509 (Dec. 27, 1994) (to be codified

at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). "After carefully evaluating the best available scientific and
commercial information regarding the past, present and future threats faced by
this species, the Service finds that listing of the Canada lynx in the contiguous
U.S. is not warranted." Id.
331 Compare 12-Month Finding, 59 Fed. Reg. at 66,507-09, with 90-Day Finding,
59 Fed. Reg. at 44,123-24. For instance, the majority of the FWS biologists agreed
that by 1996, the lynx population in the lower 48 states had declined dramatically
for many reasons, including habitat degradation, trapping, logging, road building
and other development. But FWS's 12-month finding did not specifically state
whether "existing regulatory mechanisms" were "inadequate," choosing instead to
simply describe laws that protected lynx or limited hunting and trapping. 12Month Finding, 59 Fed. Reg. at 66,508. Nor did FWS discuss petitioner's claims
that the absence of agency management plans and current state "furbearer
regulations" contributed to FWS scientists' view that lynx were "in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant part of its range." See 50 C.F.R. §
424.02(e) (2005). FWS did not publish any data quantifying past, present or future
lynx populations, claiming that "[Canada] R]ynx distribution has not significantly
changed from historic ranges except for periodic peripheral shifts of distribution
...and local losses due to loss of habitat in southern-most areas." 12-Month
Finding, 59 Fed. Reg. at 66,509; see also Lynx I, 958 F. Supp. at 679.
332 12-Month Finding, 59 Fed. Reg. at 66,508. "Historically, lynx populations
were minimal in the contiguous U.S. due to a lack of suitable habitat.... There
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The agency defined all problems bearing upon the environmentalists' petition in terms of scientific certainty (i.e., conclusive
evidence).333 The agency's strategy necessarily precluded any
petition from resulting in a species listing as threatened or
endangered; the agency constructed an unattainable standard at
odds with the institutions that were developed to implement the
ESA. On January 30, 1996, Defenders of Wildlife and other
environmental groups sued FWS, claiming that FWS's 12-month
"not warranted" finding was arbitrary and capricious. On March
27, 1997, United States District Court Judge Gladys Kessler
agreed with petitioners, concluding that FWS's decisions consistently violated the ESA and the institutions governing the
endangered species listing process.335
FWS has consistently ignored the analysis of its
expert biologists as to each of the five statutory
factors, basing its decision on unsupported conclusory
statements as well as facts which are directly contradicted by undisputed evidence in the Administrative
Record. The FWS decision not to list the Canada
Lynx and grant it the protections of the ESA is
arbitrary and capricious, applied an incorrect legal
standard, relied on glaringly faulty factual premises,
and ignored the views of its own experts.336
Judge Kessler's analysis highlights FWS administrators'
corrupt efforts to change the institutional framework governing the
ESA listing process. The Acting Director's institutional position

is evidence that the increased presence of lynx in the contiguous U.S. corresponds to cyclic dispersals from Canada." Id. FWS's ruling also concluded that
"[hiunting and trapping pressure on the lynx has been historically low in the
U.S. and there is little evidence that these activities pose a threat to the
continued
existence of this species in the wild." Id.
333
Id. at 681.
334 See Lynx I, 958 F. Supp. at 673.
335 Id. at 685.
336

d.
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"contrast [ed] starkly" with the FWS's legally accepted interpretation of the ESA's "best scientific and commercial data available"
standard.337 Judge Kessler noted that "[judicial and administrative
interpretations of the ESA have consistently construed the [ESA's]
'best available data' standard as requiring far less than 'conclusive
evidence.' 338 In the past, "FWS itself has taken the position that
it need not, and must not, wait for conclusive evidence in order to
list a species."339 The agency's senior management invented a new
standard in direct conflict with FWS's historical position.34 ° The
depth of the administrator's institutional charade is illustrated
by Judge Kessler's comments on the novel conclusive evidence
standard.
Assuming arguendo that [conclusive evidence] was
the standard, it is not at all clear that the Region 6
biologists' report was not conclusive. Given the
thorough and extensively documented 50-page
analysis of the Region 6 biologists, concluding that
the Lynx has been reduced from a range encompassing one-third of the contiguous United States to a few
remnant, scattered populations, and the overwhelming consensus among the biologists, after evaluating

...
958 F. Supp at 679.
18 Id. at 680. Judge Kessler clearly identified the lawyers'
strategy as an
attempt to re-interpret or re-frame FWS administrators' comments in an
unreasonably charitable light.
[Tihe government attempted to argue that even though the
agency's decision repeatedly used the phrase "conclusive
evidence," it was actually applying the "best available data"
standard required by the ESA. Defendant [has], however,
pointed to nothing in the Administrative Record to indicate that
the agency applied anything other than the "conclusive
evidence" standard it plainly states in its final decision. It is
well-established that this kind of"post hoc rationalization" by an
agency's lawyer cannot sustain a decision upon review.
Id.
at
681
(citation omitted).
339
340

Id. at 680.
Id.
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the existing scientific evidence, that the Lynx must
be listed, it is difficult to imagine how much more
evidence would be needed to qualify as "conclusive. " "
Finally, FWS used a scientist's opinion to accomplish
ethically questionable, legal and political objectives. The agency
claimed that a biologist supported the proposition that lynx could
exist in concert with continued logging.342 However, as Judge
Kessler pointed out, the agency took the scientist's report out-ofcontext, reframing its import in a misleading manner, in order to
argue for a political position inconsistent with the scientific
opinion. Contrary to agency representations, the biologist did not
advocate maintenance of the status quo institutional framework
governing the lynx's regulation. 3 " Instead, "the thrust of the
[biologist's] article [was] that limited logging, conditioned on
proper timber management, would not damaged the Lynx popula345
tion if the Lynx was listed and properly protected."
Conclusion

C.

In Lynx I, FWS administrators created the illusion of
scientific uncertainty by revising the informal rules governing the
agency's interpretation of the ESA's "best available science"
standard. FWS restructured the institutions determining the legal
significance of agency scientists' conclusions about listing the lynx,
just as EPA did a decade later to suppress the IPM results
contradicting EPA's legislative goal.346 Corrupt practices that
undermine environmental legislation and invade Congress's
constitutional authority cross party lines; the causes of factionalism emerge from within people in unrestrained positions of

341

Id. at 679 n.2.

342 Lynx 1, 958 F. Supp. at 683.
343 Id.
344 Id.
5
346

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 327-44 and accompanying text.
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legislative power interacting with powerful subsets of the legislated. Contemporary arrangements of political power guarantee
that environmental agencies will continue to produce unsound,
politically motivated regulatory decisions. Until Congress institutionally proscribes the Executive's authority to enact backdoor
legislation through its agencies' power, judicial intervention will
be necessary to hold administrators accountable for their corrupt
decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION-CHECKING CORRUPTION

A Constitution is only so far good, as it provides a
remedy against mal-administration. a'
-David Hume, That PoliticsMay Be Reduced to a Science
It is a matter of both wonder and regret that those
who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that
which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary
that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that
the latter is more imperfect.348
-James Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 38
Signs of corrupt influence in government decisions tend to
be discounted until catastrophes or crises develop. The Civil Rights
and Environmental Eras were sparked by citizens' outrage at the
use of government's power to tacitly or overtly support actions
destroying lives and threatening liberty. The American Revolution
shared similar features of initial public dismay, followed by
outrage and eventually armed revolt. Madison publicly described
what many citizens had observed or suspected, corruption in State

31'

David Hume, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science, in

POLITICAL ESSAYS
348

14 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2003).

THE FEDERALIST No.

38, at 205 (James Madison).

DAVID HUME
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legislatures under the Articles of Confederation. 34 9 The multiplicity
and mutability of laws, produced by the collusion of self-interested
legislators and powerful propertied interests, alarmed Madison
and inspired the creation of the Constitution's checks and balances. 35 0 The Constitution is the institutional foundation for
collective and individual liberty,35 ' providing a means to ensure
stability in government as culture and technology evolve in a
changing world.
Traditional public distrust of government's authority, a
remnant of the American Revolution, was harshly adjusted by the
Great Depression.352 Franklin Delano Roosevelt strengthened
Executive power over national security and the new administrative
state. He championed social justice initiatives grounded in
practical New Deal programs targeting socio-economic barriers
that suppressed individual economic security and national unity.353
The New Deal's institutional costs were borne by Americans
through the transfer of autonomy to administrative, centralized
authority. Americans placed their trust in administrative agencies'
large-scale creation, which significantly diminished the ongoing
responsibilities of Congress and the courts. 354 Administrative
agencies' expertise promised a new efficiency in government
benefiting all sectors of society.
As social conditions improved, Americans became increasingly concerned about the quality of life generated by an economically efficient society.355 The Environmental Era showed solid
indications of making progress against industrial power through
congressional legislation designed to protect long-term, socioecological values from short-term economic interests.35 6 Economic
sacrifice was accepted by Congress and the populace as a necessary
See supra notes
See supra notes
351 See id.
352 See supra notes
...
See supra notes
311
350

146-57 and accompanying text.
153-72 and accompanying text.
179-95 and accompanying text.
192-95 and accompanying text.

354Id.

...
supra note 2, at 3.
356 Hays,
See supra notes 6-22 and accompanying text.
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means to advance collective values and ecological essentials across
generations. The highly successful legislation created conditions
for positive technological and environmental change." 7 The
institutional means necessary to promote collective liberty through
environmental legislation's purposes and provisions were not
sufficient, however, to ensure lasting cultural change in administrative government. Agency power and susceptibility to factional
control demonstrates the wisdom of Madison's system of checks
and balances. s and renders a monumental fiction the popular
notion that the elected Executive ensures environmental agencies'
accountability to the public.35 9
Since the 1980s, administrative agencies have provided the
institutional avenue necessary for the Executive to deviate from
the letter and spirit of environmental legislation. Agencies exist in
a "zone of [constitutional] twilight"3 0 characterized by numerous,
unchecked opportunities for the Executive to create environmental
law and policy affecting Americans' collective values. The Executive's legislative power, exercised through agency authority dating
to the New Deal, produced a new institutional framework undermining the socio-ecological values of the 1960s and 1970s. Congressional
inertia and judicial reticence to apply the hard look doctrine invited
the Executive to use administrative agencies to enact legislative
agendas rejected by Congress. The net result has often been new
law; environmental legislation's progressive institutions are fast
becoming cultural relics.361 In the 21st century, environmental
317 SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION,

supra note 18, at 77-79 ("The
United States faced an enormous problem of air and water pollution in the
1960s, posing a variety of short-term and long-term threats to safety and health.
Largely as a result of environmental controls in the 1960s and 1970s, the
problem has been substantially reduced."). American government should build
on environmental legislation's success and compel industry to continue to make
technological changes fostering improvements in natural resource conditions.
3
. See supra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
39
See Farina, supra note 38, at 504.
360 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
361 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (White, J., dissenting).
For some time, the sheer amount of law-the substantive rules
that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of
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regulatory agencies have become the Executive's backdoor
legislative authority.
The creation of a balance of power in government fundamentally shapes a society's social, economic, and political relations.362
Contemporary institutional constraints are employed inadequately
to curtail factional influence over environmental policy. Broad
sustainable development platforms fail to sufficiently address
problems posed by the Executive's runaway authority over
environmental law. Sustainable development advocates aggravate
the situation by proposing the unattainable, holistic integration of
ecological, social, economic, and national security goals. Political
headway for these notions risks further empowering the Executive
and diverting valuable resources from the pressing problem of
corruption in government.
New institutions are necessary to promote technological and
cultural adaptation consistent with socio-ecological values. The
future success of environmental law and policy hinges on whether
Congress and thejudiciary restructure the institutional framework
allocating power among the various branches of government.363
First, Congress should reassert its constitutional authority and rein
in administrative agency discretion.3" Congress should expand the
OIG and GAO investigation of the EPA into federal land management agencies' rulemaking and rule implementation processes.365
government-made by the agencies has far outnumbered the
lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional
process.
Id.

HURST, supra note 82, at 42.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 126-27.
W4 HURST, supra note 208, at 153-54.
365 Specifically, oversight should extend to the Bureau of Land Management and
362
363

the Forest Service. A thorough investigation of the Forest Service's rulemaking
process that resulted in the 2005 Rule 219 is warranted to develop information
about the influence of factions on Forest Service rulemaking and rule
implementation decisions. The Final Rule 219 differs substantially from any
proposed rule's description of ecological and species diversity. The Rule arguably
eliminated the practical import of NFMA's "diversity" provision; see also HURST,
supra note 208, at 153-54.
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These investigations will reveal institutional shortcomings that
create opportunities for the corruption in environmental law and
policy. The investigations should also yield insights about the role
deliberative process of environmental
of ex parte contacts in3 the
66
law's implementation.
Second, Congress should enact specific legislation describing
civil and criminal penalties for agency employees who willfully
violate environmental laws governing information disclosure to the
public or scientific analysis procedures. Agencies' authoritative
control over information and knowledge poses a severe threat to
constitutional values of deliberation and accountability. The EPA's
mercury emissions rule and the FWS decision not to list the lynx
each turned on upper-level management's unilateral authority to
withhold from the public scientific or technical information
relevant to the reasonable review of the agency's rulemaking
decision.367 The current institutional framework is virtually barren
of enforcement characteristics necessary to steer government
decisions toward environmental legislation's long-term values and
overcome agency vulnerability to corruption.36 Congress enhances
deliberation and accountability with legislation targeting corruption in environmental law and policy.
The 1970's [sic] brought more urgent meaning to the judgment
Woodrow Wilson had passed in 1885: "It is the proper duty of a
representative body ... to be the eyes and the voice, and to
embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress
have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and
the disposition of the administrative agents of the government,
the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served...
[and] remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very
affairs which it is most important that it should understand and
direct."

Id. at 154 (quoting WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (9th
ed., Houghton Mifflin 1894)).
366 See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, supra note 50, at 74
(arguing that hard look doctrine justifies "disclosure of at least some ex parte
contacts in informal rulemaking").
367
See generallysupra Part IV.A.
368 See NORTH, supra note 42, at 33. See generally supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
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Madison did not aim solely for inter-branch accountability
in government, but also for individual accountability for unjust
government decisions compromising collective liberty. Public
officials need to be reminded that deliberation over sensitive
environmental rulemaking requires transparent and complete
communication with the American people. The potential for
political appointees or their underlings' public appearance to
explain a decision in a United States District Court (or Court of
Appeals) would serve as a substantial deterrent to factional
influence on agency behavior. Faced with the possibility of
appearing before a federal judge to explain a corrupt decision,
agencies' senior management will become less likely to issue edicts
from the backroom demanding particular results that contravene
statutory provisions and constitutional values." 9
Courts should complement congressional actions by
exercising their constitutional responsibilities to breathe new life
into the dormant hard look doctrine.37 ° The judiciary should apply
369
370

See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 171, at 438.
For a discussion of the hard look doctrine, see supra notes 218-43 and

accompanying text. In 1985, Cass Sunstein advocated less deferential judicial
review in administrative law based upon a "Madisonian conception of politics."
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50 at 68.
Professor Sunstein's view on the issue of aggressive judicial review are particularly applicable to the contemporary states of environmental law and policy.
There is an apparent anomaly in relying on principles of
Madisonian republicanism as a basis for a vigorous judicial role.
Those principles are rooted in a conception of politics which does
not easily accommodate judicial intrusions. But those intrusions
become defensible when they are based on constitutional and
statutory provisions whose purpose and effect are to improve a
political process that amounts in the circumstances to
lawmaking by powerful private groups. The judicial role.., is
justified in part by the need for some institution of government
to incline politics in Madisonian directions.
Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). Hamilton's views on the judicial role are noted:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only
that the independence of the judges may be an essential
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the
society. . . . It not only serves to moderate the immediate
mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates
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the doctrine aggressively to assess whether administrators
reasonably considered all "relevant factors" affecting an agency's
determination.371 Deliberative democracy requires judicial
satisfaction that all affected groups have been treated equally
throughout the rulemaking process.372 Courts should grant liberal
discovery to promote accountability in environmental law's
implementation. Courts should also construe the hard look
doctrine to incorporate constitutional principles of equal protection
as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who,
perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are
in a manner compelled by the very motives of the injustice they
meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance
calculated to have more influence upon the character of our
governments, than but few may be aware of.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).
" Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The
judiciary should apply the hard look doctrine when reviewing agency decisions
to determine whether administrators reasonably considered all "relevant
factors" affecting an agency's determination. Id.; see also State Farm, 463 U.S.
29, 39-43; Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 403. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, supra note 50, at 74, suggesting that courts should
continue the development of substantive and procedural
devices designed to ensure against factional tyranny in the
implementation process. Such devices would include general
application and extension of the four basic requirements of
the current hard-look doctrine-to require, for example,
disclosure of at least some ex parte contacts in informal
rulemaking. The basic goal would be to ensure that agency
outcomes reflect some form of deliberation on the part of agency
officials. The deliberative process should in turn involve
statutorily relevant factors.
Id.
372 "In a deliberative democracy, the exercise of public power must be justified
by legitimate reason-not merely by the will of some segment of society, and
indeed not merely by the will of the majority." SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 150; see also Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, supra
note 50, at 53. The Madisonian "conception of politics-that legislators have a
deliberative responsibility-is quite broad. It captures a theme that pervades
American constitutional law. Indeed, that conception is the most plausible
candidate we have for a unitary understanding of the sorts of conduct forbidden
by the Constitution." Id.
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and due process in order to assess the legitimacy of rulemaking
decisions representing Executive legislation.373
Courts should be especially wary of agencies' "expert"
decisions.374 Administrators' choices among different spatial and
temporal dimensions critically determine the relevance of the
scientific and social consequences of a particular policy. Judicial
deference to agencies' scientific decisions too often ignores the
nature of scientific investigation and analysis, and the impact of
values upon the process of declaring an approach to be based
upon the best available science or the maximum achievable
technology. 5 The mercury emissions rulemaking process and the

"' See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note 50, at 75.
("One way to take the Madisonian understanding more seriously would be for
courts to reform the doctrines of standing, reviewability, and scope of review so
as to treat the beneficiaries of regulation generally in the same way as regulated
entities."). Sunstein argues that most of the developments in
administrative law have occurred without constitutional
compulsion. They must be understood either as a species of
statutory interpretation-of the Administrative Procedure Act
and of governing substantive statutes-or as federal common
law. But the developments are strikingly similar in both form
and ultimate aim to developments under equal protection
review.
Id. at 64-65 (footnote omitted).
114 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 647 (1971).
A court does not depart from its proper function when it
undertakes a study of the record, hopefully perceptive, even as
to the evidence on technical and specialized matters, for this
enables the court to penetrate to the underlying decisions of the
agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned
discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the
ascertainable legislative intent.
Id. at 648 (citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850,
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)) (footnote omitted).
...See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of
Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004). "When
agencies rely on science to explain the policy decisions they make, they ...
escape their duty to provide a principled account of their decision making." Id.
at 1359.
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Lynx I case poignantly illustrate that agencies make the value
judgment necessary to decide how scientific uncertainty should
affect policy decisions.376 In the EPA and FWS cases, the agencies
exploited their authority over scientific knowledge relevant to a
rulemaking decision, engaging in a form of epistemological
authoritarianism to achieve political objectives."' Institutional
change that promotes deliberation in administrative rulemaking
processes protects environmental law's norms and the credibility
of legitimate scientific knowledge claims.
Regulatory agency decisions that deny deliberation and
subvert accountability threaten the well-being of present and
future generations. Environmental legislation enacted in the 1960s
and '70s aimed to restructure institutions responsible for protecting Americans' interests in biodiversity and environmental quality.
In short, EPA's use of a science-based rhetoric enabled it to
avoid responsibility for providing any clear, consistent reasons
for its policy choices in setting air quality standards. The
Agency's shifting and incoherent approach to its NAAQS
decisions ultimately failed to live up to the aspiration for
reasoned decision making that undergirds contemporary
administrative law.
Id. at 1260-61 (citations omitted). See generally id. at 1290-1323.
376 See supra Parts IV.A. and IV.B.
...Rudd, The Forest Service's Epistemic Judgments, supra note 266, at 163
(describing the "the exercise of the [Forest Service's] institutional power to
unilaterally deny knowledge claims accepted as 'scientific' by the broader
scientific community").
[T]he Forest Service is in the enviable position of writing its own
rules and determining how knowledge claims should be
identified and evaluated before being judged "scientific" for
NFMA purposes.... The Service's institutional power to write
its own rules insulates it from public concerns that its
management decisions may unfairly disregard "new knowledge."
In the process, Forest Service scientists are also proscribed from
effectively participating in the broader scientific communities'
intersubjective and transformative criticism of new knowledge
claims. Forest Service administrators dictate which scientific
claims to accept as valid, irrespective the views of the broader
scientific community or agency scientists.
Id. at 181-82 (footnote omitted).
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Congress overlooked, however, the power of special interests to
reconfigure distributions of authority and undermine environmental law's purposes through administrative rules. The American
public pays the ultimate price for the Executive's authority to
enact "backdoor" legislation; the loss of individual freedom to
participate in government decisions that may constrain one's
health and welfare. The vast majority of environmental regulatory
agency employees suffer an additional indignity through the
sequestration of their professional, credible, and diligently
prepared reports and contributions to the rulemaking process. A
renaissance in environmental law's collective values calls for the
restructuring of administrative institutions that dominate
American environmental policy.

